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Foreword to the
Second Edition
The Philanthropy Roundtable is dedicated to helping donors achieve
their charitable objectives. The Roundtable offers expert advice and
counsel to individual donors and foundations that are its members and
brings donors together with others who share their interest in formulating and implementing philanthropic strategies that work.
Part of the mission of the Roundtable is to make its members aware
of the features of the legal and policy climate that may affect donors’
ability to achieve their charitable aims most effectively. In recent years,
this climate has included increasing pressures from some public officials
and advocacy groups to subject private philanthropies to more uniform
standards and stricter government regulation. Such changes could significantly affect the ability of philanthropies to continue to play their
role in supporting and nourishing American pluralism.
A major justification cited by advocates of these proposals is the
claim that philanthropic assets are “public money.” These advocates
argue that the charitable tax exemption and deduction are government
subsidies; thus, philanthropic funds are public money and should be
publicly controlled. Some advocates also claim that philanthropic assets
are public money because philanthropies operate under state charters
and are subject to state oversight.
The Roundtable offered support to two noted legal scholars, Evelyn
Brody and John Tyler, to prepare a monograph and a longer law review
article evaluating the authorities and precedents applicable to the “public money” claim. This support was provided by the Roundtable without any restrictions on content. The original publication of this
9
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monograph was in June 2009, when the authors presented the results
of their evaluation. The monograph was well received and provided a
strong foundation for the position and protection of private philanthropy in the public world. Since the original publication, there have
been some key legal developments, including an important Supreme
Court case (Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn)
that bolsters the authors’ original conclusions.
The authors conclude the “public money” claim is not well founded
in legal authority. They find that state oversight of philanthropies is
based on the need to ensure that philanthropies pursue charitable rather
than private purposes, not on an assertion that philanthropies are subject to state direction or that their assets belong to the public. Similarly,
the authors find, the fact that philanthropies have state charters does
not make them state agencies or generally subject them to the constraints that apply to public bodies.
Finally, the authors find that philanthropies and their donors receive
their federal tax benefits in return for the obligation to pursue public rather
than private purposes and to comply with the laws designed to ensure the
pursuit of such purposes; there is no evidence that these benefits were
meant to give government other types of control over philanthropies.
Thus, advocates of greater government control of philanthropies may
not justify their proposals with the claim that philanthropic assets are
public money. The advocates may make other arguments for their position; but these arguments must be evaluated in light of the strong authority in favor of charitable independence, the contributions of foundations
and other charities to American society under the traditional, limited
philanthropy-government relationship, and the serious consequences that
greater government control could have for this relationship.
—Adam Meyerson, president, The Philanthropy Roundtable
Sue Santa, senior vice president for public policy,
The Philanthropy Roundtable
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Preface
The Changing Debate
From colonial times, Americans have debated the role of philanthropy
in our national life. The debates have reflected the diversity of our underlying views about the relationships among government, business, and
civil society. The vigor of our disagreements has been a tribute to the
strength of American pluralism and the worldwide significance of the
American philanthropic sector.
Evidencing a recurrence of these discussions over the past decade,
there has been a marked increase in the number and breadth of prescriptive proposals from both government and the philanthropic sector to impose legal limits on the purposes that philanthropies may serve, the
strategies they may use to pursue these purposes, and the means by which
they may govern themselves. Some of the proposals are targeted, such as
calling for legislation to set the number of directors on tax-exempt boards,
to cap executive compensation and to prohibit paying fees to directors,
to declare foundations and other charities quasi-public bodies, and to impose limits on administrative expenses relative to foundation assets or expenditures as a whole. Other proposals are sweeping and would require
philanthropies to adopt externally determined goals, such as representativeness and broad-based social justice purposes, either as limitations on
or additions to the mandates of donors and legally constituted boards.

The “Public Money” Claim and Its
Policy Implications
The reach of these proposals reflects the increasingly broad claims being
made about the public’s purported right to direct philanthropic organizations—because, proponents assert or assume, philanthropic assets are
12
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“public money.” In a striking example, a bill introduced in the New York
State Assembly in 2011 that seeks to restrict asset sales by New York museums was grounded on a proposed legislative finding that “all” museums
within the state, because they are “directly chartered by the legislature,”
are thereby rendered “creatures of State government” and, as such, are
“subject to the public interest.”1 Elsewhere, recent threats to nonprofit autonomy were scaled back or rejected, but at one quickly returned.2 In 2011,
for example, the Nevada legislature entertained a bill that, as initially introduced, would have declared tax-exempt organizations “quasi-public
bodies” subject to various transparency requirements3; and the Oregon
Attorney General, supported by the state association of nonprofits, proposed (unsuccessfully) that the state charitable-contribution deduction
should be denied for donations to charities that fail to spend, on average,
at least 30 percent of total annual functional expenses on program
services.4 While it ultimately did not survive 2011 budget negotiations, a
1. A3957-2011: Relates to the accessioning and de-accessioning of museum property (Jan. 31, 2011) (available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=
&bn=A03957&term=&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Votes=Y&Memo=Y&Text
=Y) See also Maureen Glabman, Health Plan Foundations: How Well Are They
Spending Money?, MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE (August 2008) (available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0808/0808.foundations.html).
2. See Lisa Chiu, Lawmakers in 2 States Strike Down High-Profile Bills to Regulate Nonprofits, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, July 6, 2011, available at
http://philanthropy.com/article/High-Profile-Bills-to-Regulate/128152/ (reporting that a Massachusetts “senator would continue to push the board-compensation measure this fall as part of a stand-alone bill. A similar bill has been
introduced in a Massachusetts House committee”; and “in Oregon, Mr. Kroger
plans to continue moving forward with his effort to crack down on charities
that spend a large portion of their revenue on fund raising.”).
3. See Nev. Assemb. 242, 76th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011). As ultimately
passed, the bill instead creates a new term of art—“designated agencies”—which
includes only those I.R.C. § 501(c) organizations that are party to interlocal
agreements or that receive funding from the Nevada Department of Health and
Human Services.
4. See Nonprofit Association of Oregon, Nonprofit Association of Oregon Supports SB40 (April 29, 2011), available at http://www.nonprofitoregon.org/sites/
default/files/uploads/file/SB40%20policy%20brief_4-20-11.pdf.
13
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Massachusetts Senate amendment would have presumptively prohibited
compensating independent directors, officers, or trustees of charities; a
hearing was held in September 2011 on a similar proposal in the House.5
Each of these attempts could arguably be based on the idea that the funds
spent by tax-exempt organizations are, in a material sense, public.
If philanthropic assets are public money, the argument goes, it follows that the public may impose rules concerning their expenditure and
governance of the entities that hold them.6 In this view, there are few
principled limits on the right of the public to direct philanthropies and
their funds. Thus, the public-money argument would significantly
change the philanthropy-government relationship.
Under the traditional, limited relationship between philanthropy and
government, voluntary organizations fulfill a critical role in realizing the
promise of American pluralism. A fundamental change in this relationship could jeopardize the balance that voluntary organizations provide
to our civil society.
5. See Martha Coakley, Massachusetts Attorney General, AG Coakley Testifies in Support of Legislation to Restrict Director Pay at Massachusetts Public Charities (Sept.
27, 2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&
L=1&L0=Home&sid=Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2011-09-27-dir-compensation-testimony&csid=Cago, with reference to House Bill 3516 (2011), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H03516. That bill would allow compensation only on “a clear and convincing showing that compensation is necessary
to enable the public charity to attract and retain experienced and competent individuals to serve as independent officers, directors or trustees.” (Note that the term
“public charity” under Massachusetts law includes private foundations.) The Massachusetts Senate had voted generally to cap compensation paid to senior managers
of large Massachusetts charities. See http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/
S00003/Amendment/204/Text.
6. For example, in 2008, Republican Gov. Matt Blunt of Missouri tried to compel
a private Missouri foundation to use 80 percent of its grant budget to support
under-funded state health care programs. “There is a strong argument,” he explained, “that those assets rightly belong to Missouri taxpayers.” Letter from
Gov. Matt Blunt to Missouri Foundation for Health (May 27, 2008), quoted in
Yours, Mine, and His, Editorial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 29, 2008 (available at http://www.stltoday.com/blogzone/the-platform/publishededitorials/2008/05/friday-editorial-yours-mine-and-his/).
14
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The Need to Examine the Public-Money
Argument
Such an alteration in the role of voluntary organizations should not be
accepted without first seriously examining the validity of the publicmoney argument that supports it and the attendant consequences. The
aim of this monograph is to begin such an examination. The analysis is
not a detailed discussion of current debates over specific policies. Instead, this monograph deals more narrowly but no less ambitiously with
possible sources of government’s legal authority, in the name of “public
money,” to limit the missions, governance, and decision-making of philanthropic organizations.
The analysis considers three chief arguments that are most commonly
advanced, separately and in combination, for the claim that philanthropic
assets are public money. Proponents have argued that philanthropies have
public rather than private purposes and are subject to broad parens patriae
oversight by state Attorneys General. A second argument asserts that, because philanthropies exist under state charters, they are government agencies, “state actors,” or quasi-public bodies subject to constitutional
constraints or accountable to the public in the same way as is government.
Finally and most commonly, “public money” advocates contend that funds
held by nonprofit organizations are public money because governments
forgo revenue by exempting such organizations from taxation and allowing
tax deductions to donors.
Our review demonstrates that the applicable legal precedents recognize the importance of philanthropic independence, respect philanthropies as private entities, and accord them the right to autonomy
without undue government or public direction and control. In sum, the
public-money argument cannot justify overly prescriptive government
regulation or public involvement, because the rationale for the argument is largely mythical.
15
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Our analysis does not defend philanthropies from government involvement by saying, “You can’t do this to us.” Instead, it says, more
modestly, “You can’t do this to us on grounds that our assets or operations are public.” Stated differently, if philanthropic assets cannot fairly
be characterized as public money, proponents of increased government
or public mandates must put forth other grounds for imposing on the
purposes, structure, and operations of foundations and other charities.
If successful, this monograph makes that case and effectively challenges
the term “public money” and its application.

16

Introduction
The Semantics of the Public-Money Debate
The modern labeling of philanthropic money as “public money” evidences
a form of semantic elasticity and conflation by which words are initially
used with one meaning but acquire another, often broader, meaning over
time.1 In legal fields ranging from constitutional law to trademark law, we
see examples of this phenomenon.2 In philanthropy, such semantic confusion is common, as we see even with how to label organizations in the sector. As it relates to the phrase “public money,” mere confusion seems to
have given way to danger as the phrase “public money” has been given
meanings that blur the complicated lines that separate philanthropic entities from government and from enterprises that pursue private profit.

A. The Roots of Confusion
Three common characteristics contribute to how people often refer to
foundations and other charities. These entities typically are nonprofit
corporations under state law, enjoy exemption from federal taxation
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and generally
offer their donors charitable deductions. These features have resulted
in seemingly interchangeable uses of the words “nonprofits,” “exempt
organizations,” “501(c)(3) organizations,” and “charities” even though
these words are not literally synonymous, as the long history of semantic confusion in the sector demonstrates.
1. The philanthropic entities to which advocates apply the “public” label include
not just “public charities” but also organizations that are classified by federal
tax law as “private foundations.”
2. The words “aspirin,” “escalator,” and “zipper” were introduced as names of
particular brands. Over time, however, the terms came to be applied to whole
classes of similar items and could no longer serve their original purpose of distinguishing those brands. The possibility of such creeping confusion is the reason why modern brands such as Xerox®, Kleenex®, and Coca-Cola® are
protected with such vigor.
17
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English common and statutory law relating to philanthropy, to
which our law traces, has its origins in the law of charitable trusts.
Even before the adoption of the Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601, the
English have referred to philanthropic entities as “charities.” To laymen, the term “charity” calls to mind alms-giving, anti-poverty, or at
least purely donative efforts.3 The common law definition of charity,
however, has long embraced a wide variety of organizations including
not only social service and grant-making organizations, but also hospitals, universities, religious organizations, and arts and cultural entities.
American law took a different approach because of the historical preference that resulted in most U.S. charities being formed as nonprofit corporations. (Some state statutes refer to “nonstock” or “not-for-profit”
corporations.) But the term “nonprofit” is imprecise in at least two ways.
First, nonprofit corporations, contrary to what the label suggests, are not
actually required to operate at a zero profit margin. Instead, nonprofit
corporations, just like business corporations, are permitted to earn a surplus, or profit, from year to year. What distinguishes nonprofit corporations is the fact that they, unlike their for-profit counterparts, are not
permitted to distribute this surplus, or profit, for the private benefit of
their members, if any, or of any other person.4 Second, nonprofit corporations include not just philanthropic organizations but also mutual benefit organizations such as social clubs, labor unions, and trade associations.5
3. The same donative connotation, albeit to a lesser extent, attaches to the
broader terms “philanthropic” and “benevolent.”
4. Henry Hansmann has called this limitation the “nondistribution constraint.”
Hansmann, Economic Theories of the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 27, 28 (W. Powell, ed., Yale University Press, 1987).
5. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) attempted more precision, offering three classifications of non-business corporations: public-benefit corporations,
mutual-benefit corporations, and religious corporations. The term “public-benefit”
has the advantage of being an affirmative statement of the outward-looking purpose
of such an organization but has not been widely adopted by legislatures. The more
recent Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (3d ed. 2008) omits the tripartite distinction and merely offers some special provisions for “charitable corporations.”
18
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In short, nonprofit corporations having charitable purposes are a subset
of the nonprofit sector.
In light of these semantic difficulties, it has become common instead
to refer to the various types of nonprofit organizations by their congressional designation under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code (the “Code”).6 Notably, section 501(c)(3) provides federal tax
exemption for the following types of organizations:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition . . . , or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . , and which does not participate in,
or intervene in . . . , any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.7
6. In footnotes, the “Code” or “IRC.” While the current statutory numbering system
dates to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, all of the congressional legislative income tax acts and codes dating back to 1894 “contain the substance of the original exemption in favor of charitable, religious, and educational institutions.”
Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy (1975), in IV RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS,
GIVING IN AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 2025, 2025
(U.S. Treasury Department 1977) (available at https://iupui.edu/handle/2450/805).
This project is known as the “Filer Commission” after its chairman, John H.
Filer, and citations below are to “FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS.”
7. Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) explains: “The term ‘charitable’ is
used in section 503(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore,
not to be construed as limited by the separate enumerations in section 501(c)(3)
of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of ‘charity’ as developed by judicial decisions.” The regulation identifies “lessening of
the burdens of Government” as one example of such other tax-exempt purposes.
19
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“Tax-exempt” and “section 501(c)(3)”—like “nonprofit”—thus have
become more or less interchangeable ways to refer to charities. Unfortunately, there are problems with the tax-based approach as well. First,
mutual-benefit organizations are also tax-exempt, but under different
subsections of section 501(c).8 Second, not all charities are tax-exempt:
An entity’s assets may be protected as charitable under state law even
if the entity has never obtained, or if it obtained but later forfeited, exempt status. Third, “private foundations” are distinguished in section
509(a) of the Code from charities that are not private foundations, colloquially referred to as “public charities” (even though there is no such
term in the Code as a “private charity” or a “public foundation”).9
Separately, as discussed below, a state-law charity that engages in too
much lobbying to qualify for section 501(c)(3) status may instead qualify as exempt under the less desirable section 501(c)(4).10 Finally, employing tax nomenclature carries the risk of overstating the importance
of tax treatment and undervaluing—or even wholly neglecting—the
non-tax contributions of these enterprises to our nation’s economic,
social, and political systems.
Outside the United States, the organizations that give us so much
terminological trouble are commonly referred to as some variant of
“non-governmental organizations.” Ironically, the non-U.S. label, with
its emphasis on these entities not being part of government, may be the
term that best addresses the recent threats to the autonomy of the philanthropic sector in America.
8. Not all tax-exempt organizations may offer their contributors tax-deductibility
for donations and membership dues. Donations to § 501(c)(3) organizations
are normally deductible as charitable contributions; but donations to organizations that are exempt under other parts of § 501(c) may be deductible, if at all,
only as business expenses.
9. For ease of reference, we may refer to all charitable organizations that are not
foundations under §509(a) as “other charities.”
10. A large trade association devoted to the interests of § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations as such calls itself Independent Sector, but this term has not broadly
caught on as a label encompassing these two types of exempt organizations.
20
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B. The Modern Public-Money Claim
Today, we face the prospect of additional and consequential terminological confusion as a result of the claim—or assumption—that foundation and other charitable assets are not only dedicated to public
purposes but are also publicly owned. This creeping change in terminology would legitimate the principle of increased government or public
interference with foundations and other charities and de-legitimate the
traditional principles of self-governance and private decision-making.
The idea of philanthropic assets as public money is not an invention
of the past decade. In 1968, Alan Pifer, then president of the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, noted the existence of the term in order to
reject its implications:
There is a common misunderstanding that the public
character of the foundation, and hence the public stake
in it, derives from its tax-exempt status. How frequently
has one heard it said that foundations are really spending
public money, and therefore should be subject to greater
governmental control. Such a view, however, is based on
fallacious reasoning and reveals either surprising ignorance or a dangerous disavowal of one of the basic tenets
of the American system.11

11. ALAN PIFER, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION
(1968), reprinted in AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, FOUNDATIONS UNDER FIRE 54 (Thomas C. Reeves, ed., 1970). Mr. Pifer reiterated this
view in 1970 when he observed, “A second disturbing theme of the legislative
proceedings in Washington has been the assertion that foundation income is
really public money, because it is itself tax exempt and because it derives from
. . . gifts which offer donors tax advantage.” ELEANOR L. BRILLIANT, PRIVATE
CHARITY AND PUBLIC INQUIRY: A HISTORY OF THE FILER AND PETERSON COMMISSIONS 99 (2000).
21
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Compare the sense in which Merrimon Cuninggim, then president of
the Danforth Foundation, suggested in a 1972 book that the term
“public money” could apply to foundation assets.12 He struggled with
the problem of devising a shorthand way to characterize foundation
assets in light of the legal obligations of foundations to dedicate these
assets exclusively to charitable purposes. While Cuninggim concluded
that the assets merited the term “public money” in the sense that they
no longer belonged to the donor, he proposed “non-governmental” as
more accurate than “private” as a general description of foundations.
But Cuninggim also insisted on an “immensely important distinction”:
The decisions of foundations remained “private” and beyond the
“hands of the general public or of Government.”13
However, more recent invocations of the idea of public money have
neglected to add Cuninggim’s “immensely important distinction.”
Thus, a 2009 report by a private advocacy group has used the fact that
foundation money no longer belongs to the donor, as well as the federal
tax exemption and charitable deduction, to justify asserting that specific segments of the public—as determined by persons outside the charities themselves—are entitled to their “fair” distribution of charitable
assets and to representation on the boards and in the management of
12. MERRIMON CUNINGGIM, PRIVATE MONEY AND PUBLIC SERVICE (1972).
13. Id. at 4–5. Cuninggim’s fuller definition shows the complexity of his thinking:
“Foundations are non-governmental agencies, privately established and
managed, but in which the public has a stake and which are answerable to
Government, possessing financial resources, usually in the form of endowment, and existing to serve the general welfare or some chosen segment of
it, usually in the form of grants.” Id. at 5. In contrast, a 1975 report by the
Council on Foundations, while recognizing the issue that Cuninggim raised,
did not call charitable assets public money but instead stated that foundations should recognize the principle that foundation assets are “[n]ot our
money, but charity’s”; this principle would serve to “minimize any tendency
to act out of concerns related to personal benefit or convenience.” Chairman and Staff, Council on Foundations, Private Foundations and the 1969
Tax Reform Act (1975), in III FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra
note 12, at 1557, 1592.
22
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foundations and other charities.14 Compare a 2004 proposal by the
staff of the Senate Finance Committee to require that the size of a taxexempt organization’s governing board be no fewer than three and no
more than fifteen.15 Separately, a few states require that a majority of
the directors of a nonprofit corporation be financially disinterested or
unrelated to each other.16
In ways that are less visible but no less important, the Internal Revenue Service, through its administration of the Code, has increasingly
focused on the governance, structures, missions, effectiveness, programs,
and similar aspects of the operations of foundations and other charities.
14. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, CRITERIA FOR
PHILANTHROPY AT ITS BEST: BENCHMARKS TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE GRANTMAKER IMPACT (March 2009) (available at http://www.ncrp.org/paib). See also
Pablo Eisenberg, Foundation Boards Shouldn’t Be Filled Just with Wealthy
People (Op-Ed), CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, June 1, 2011.
15. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE
PROPOSALS, Discussion Draft, 13 (June 22, 2004) (available at http://finance.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062204stfdis.pdf). State nonprofit corporation
statutes commonly require a minimum of three directors, but no state imposes
a maximum.
16. California law requires that a charity’s managers make up no more than fortynine percent of its board. Cal. Corp. Code § 5227. No more than forty-nine percent of the board of a “public benefit corporation” may be “financially
interested persons” under the laws of Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B §
713-a(2) and Vermont (11B V.S.A. § 8.13(a) (same).) North Dakota imposes the
same limit for a nonprofit corporate board (N.D. Cent. Code, § 10-33-27). The
broadest prescription for the governance structure of nonprofits (with exceptions
for private foundations and religious organizations) appears in New Hampshire’s Voluntary Corporations and Associations statute, as amended in 1996:
In the interest of encouraging diversity of discussion, connection
with the public, and public confidence, the board of directors of
a charitable nonprofit corporation shall have at least 5 voting
members, who are not of the same immediate family or related
by blood or marriage. No employee of a charitable nonprofit
corporation shall hold the position of chairperson or presiding
officer of the board.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292:6-a. The statute provides for a waiver of these restrictions by the state’s director of charitable trusts upon application. Id.
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For instance, in 2008 the IRS redesigned its Form 990, the tax information return that about half of filing public charities use, in part to require detailed disclosure of board member independence, compensation,
and related policies.
Additionally, in determination letters denying or revoking tax exemptions, the IRS informally has been staking out positions on a range
of substantive questions concerning particular activities or governance
practices that may jeopardize an exemption. For example, it has been
reported that the Service has demanded a minimum of three unrelated
board members—even though there is no such requirement in any
statute or regulation and the Service cannot deny exemption on this
basis alone. In a 2008 report, a high-level advisory committee to the
IRS Commissioner in the area of tax-exempt entities commented, “Our
personal experience and research for this report suggest . . . that the
IRS may require specific governance practices on an ad hoc and inconsistent basis.”17 The report added that in “various contexts,” the IRS
“has created a per se requirement for exemption that requires the organization be governed by an independent body. The IRS’s position,
however, has not always been sustained by the courts and we are concerned about per se requirements.”18
These recent proposals and initiatives show that the publicmoney theory has surpassed mere semantics and entered the realm of
attempting to justify far-reaching assertions of public authority. Historically, proponents have relied on three groups of arguments for their
17. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATION GOOD GOVERNANCE ISSUES 3 (June 11, 2008)
(available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege_act_rpt7.pdf). See also James
J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545 (2010).
18. Id. at 31.
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conclusion: (1) foundations and other charities must serve public rather
than private purposes, for which the state Attorney General has traditionally provided oversight; (2) foundations and other charities are
chartered by the state or otherwise qualify as state actors or quasi-public bodies; and/or (3) foundations and other charities receive taxfavored treatment. None of these theories, however, actually supports
the argument that foundation or other charity money is public or the
corresponding assertions of public authority over governance, purposes, operations, or decision-making.
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Chapter I:
The Parens Patriae Claim
Neither the fact that foundations and other charities have
public purposes nor the fact that they are subject to the Attorney General’s parens patriae power supports a claim that
these organizations must serve the same ends as those of
government or that government may unduly intrude in their
governance and other decision-making.
It is easy to see how the fact that foundations and other charities serve
one or more public purposes could be misconstrued as a requirement
that the purposes of a particular entity should be subject to the will of
the general public.1 In reality, however, the requirement that foundations and other charities provide “public” benefits does not render their
assets or operations public or subject them to public direction. After
all, it is a private decision that determines which charitable purposes
to serve and how to serve them, and government regulatory oversight
does not equate with ownership or convert to control.

1. Thus, Jeffrey Hart has called foundations “shadow governments.” Hart, Foundations and Social Activism: A Critical View, in AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 43, 47 (1973). For John Simon’s disagreement and cogent defense of the unique role of foundations, see Simon,
Foundations and Public Controversy: An Affirmative View, in id. at 58, 79–
100. See generally JENNIFER R. WOLCH, THE SHADOW STATE: GOVERNMENT AND
VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN TRANSITION (1990). Perhaps the “most troubling
dilemma of the shadow state,” Wolch writes, “is that the voluntary sector may
become a puppet or pawn in the service of goals that are antithetical to their
organizational mission. Organizations that do not conform or are not ‘ideologically correct’ from the perspective of the state at a given historical moment
may be denied access to direct and even indirect resources.” Id., p. 217.
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A. Private parties determine both the
charitable purposes that particular
foundations and other charities pursue
and the structure for doing so.
Foundations and other charities are a unique expression of our nation’s
centuries-long culture of voluntary association, private action for public
good, and altruistic dedication of resources to support neighbor, community, and society. Foundations express this culture by providing a
legal structure through which individuals can make two types of fundamentally private, voluntary decisions, neither of which supports
treating assets as “public.”
First, in choosing to donate their assets, donors voluntarily and irrevocably give up the right to use these assets for personal benefit and
agree to abide by the statutory prohibition on using the assets or the
revenues they produce for impermissible private benefit.
The second private decision by the donor is the choice of just how
the funds should be devoted for all time to charitable purposes for
“public benefit.” Under state law, creators of a nonprofit foundation
or other charity choose its particular charitable purposes, organizational form, and governance structure, and they have broad authority
to carry out such purposes as they think advisable. The requirement
that a foundation or charity provide a “public benefit” does not imply
that all members of the general public or of a particular jurisdiction
must be the beneficiaries. Indeed, the use of the terms “public” and
“community” in this context is not necessarily geographic: State law
empowers the entity’s founders and subsequent governors to determine
whether operations will have a particular geographic scope. Moreover,
there is no necessary consensus about any single nonprofit’s “public
benefit.” Different charities focus on complementary, overlapping, or
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even competing goals as a matter of choice and as an elemental expression of values inherent in our civil society.
Even when the narrower, more correct meaning of “public” is used
as a proxy for “charity,” the question arises about whether the requirement of “charitable purposes” includes a specific obligation to serve
the poor. Policymakers currently hear increasing demands that charities—particularly the two largest nonprofit sub-sectors, hospitals and
higher education—provide greater distributional equity. Notably,
prompted by financial pressures and concerns about the health needs
of the uninsured, politicians and regulators are exploring ways to make
charity care a condition of tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals.2
However, focusing on redistribution assumes that charity should
supplement government, not complement it. Government, because of
its powers to tax and to allocate resources across the population as a
whole, has by far the comparative advantage in the general distribution
of income and benefits. Foundations and other charities, for their part,
have a comparative advantage in ascertaining local or specialized needs
and delivering services flexibly and compassionately. Thus, for example, government provides subsidies like Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement or tax benefits like education tax credits to individual
consumers for services delivered by private providers, nonprofit and
sometimes proprietary.3 While many foundations and other charities—
notably in the current challenging economic environment—have chosen
to focus their efforts on serving the needy or disadvantaged communities, this is a choice that results from private decision-making.

2. See the intermediate steps taken by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, which enacted new Code section 501(r), providing that an
exempt hospital must meet requirements for a “community health needs assessment” and a “financial assistance policy,”
3. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NONPROFIT SECTOR: SIGNIFICANT
FEDERAL FUNDS REACH THE SECTOR THROUGH VARIOUS MECHANISMS, BUT MORE
COMPLETE AND RELIABLE FUNDING DATA ARE NEEDED (GAO-09-193, 2009).
28

Evelyn Brody and John Tyler

As with for-profit business, there are certain interests that the public
has in the operations of foundations and other charities, but that interest does not transform into a legal right to dictate operations or expenditures. For instance, for-profit businesses are not immune from the
influence of boycotts, negative marketing campaigns, and competition.
The influence, of course, derives from the impact of such activities on
the business’ customers and shareholders. Although foundations and
other charities do not have customers or shareholders, the public
may—and does—influence foundations and other charities through
various means while preserving the organizations’ independence, autonomy, and privacy.
Similarly, a demand that foundations and charities serve governmental purposes neglects the benefits that charities provide precisely
because they are not the government. Nonprofits, including foundations, are important vehicles for expression. Their views differ on many
subjects. Consider family planning, educational strategies, and environmental issues. Many nonprofits express non-majoritarian ideas.
Congruence with government at the community, state, or national level
is neither the assigned function of foundations and other charities nor
desirable for our society as a whole.

B. The state’s authority to regulate and
supervise charities does not grant the
state directive power over foundations or
other charities or transform their assets
into property of the state or the general
public.
Under American common law and its predecessor English common
law, the state, usually through its Attorney General, has a responsibility
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How Public is Private Philanthropy?

to ensure that charitable assets are used for their intended purposes.4
To fulfill this responsibility, the Attorney General’s office typically
achieves its aims by counseling charity fiduciaries concerning their duties, exercising investigative powers, and, when necessary, entering into
settlements. Although an Attorney General has the authority to sue for
breaches of fiduciary duty that have not otherwise been remedied, compulsory power over charities is generally reserved to the courts.
The Attorney General’s powers with respect to charities do not derive from a view of charitable assets as governmental or public assets.
Instead, these powers reflect the fact that there is often no one else with
standing to enforce charitable fiduciary duties. The Attorney General’s
standing to bring suit does not confer authority to serve as a “super”
member of charity boards; and state oversight authority does not extend to a general governmental power to mandate that governing
boards include public officials or community representatives.5 Similarly,
4. The Uniform Law Commission recently adopted a model law for state enactment that more clearly defines the nature and scope of authority of the chief
state charity official in overseeing charitable assets. See Model Protection of
Charitable Assets Act (2011), available at www.uniformlaws.org. The Drafting
Committee was clear, however, that “assets held by a charity are not converted
to public (governmental) assets” because the chief charity official is charged
with protecting the public interest in charitable assets. Id., Section 3, Comment, para. 4. The Committee was also clear that “[r]estrictions imposed by
donors and the governing documents of the charity control the use of the assets
and the government will not take over and manage the charity.” Id. The Committee reiterated these points by emphasizing that “[t]he state cannot substitute
its own judgment as to how a charity should be managed or who should manage it, and the legislature cannot convert charitable assets to government assets,” Id., Section 3, Comment, para. 5.
5. See, e.g., a Texas appeals court decision refusing a request to authorize the expansion of the board of a $120 million family foundation from three to seven:
If . . . a court could disregard the settlor’s plan for administration
of a public charity simply because the judge believed that another
plan would be better, such rule would substantially discourage the
establishment of charitable trusts, or, at least, encourage the settlers
to seek other jurisdictions in which to establish them. The adoption
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the law generally refrains from dictating how a charity constitutes its
governing board and how the board should carry out its duties of setting policy and supervising officers.6
However, not all courts can be relied on to prevent states from impairing traditional charitable independence and even from acting, in
effect, to confiscate charitable assets. Consider the attempt by the Milton Hershey School Trust to diversify its holdings by selling a controlling amount of stock of the Hershey Foods Corporation of Hershey,
Pennsylvania. In 2002, after the trust announced its intention to sell
the stock, the Attorney General, a Republican candidate for Governor,
drafted legislation to require, among other things, that a Pennsylvania
charitable trust considering the sale of a controlling interest in a business consider the welfare of the affected community and obtain the approval of the Attorney General and the court. Invoking the proposed
legislation, the Attorney General then filed suit to halt the sale in the
absence of court approval.
The Attorney General’s petition to the Orphans’ Court invoked case
law granting the Attorney General authority “to inquire into the status,
activities and functioning of public charities.”7 The petition also asserted as follows:
of such a rule also would upset the stability of many of the charitable foundations that now exist in Texas. . . . [Many,] including the
largest ones, have fewer than seven trustees.
Moody v. Haas, 493 S.W.2d 555, 567 (Tex. App. 1973). The court expressed
its disapproval of expert testimony calling for board representation of geographic, professional, and minority-group diversity and noted that the “selection of individuals who are to administer the trust may substantially influence
not only the manner in which the trust is administered but also the areas of the
charitable purpose that will be emphasized. Id. at 562, 564.
6. See generally Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L. J. 1008–17 (2004). For examples of the few
states that have departed from this general principle, see “Introduction” note 16.
7. Attorney General, Commw. of Pennsylvania, Petition for Citation for Rule to
Show Cause (Aug. 12, 2002), available at www.findlaw.com.
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Any public sale of the controlling interest in Hershey
Foods Corporation by the School Trust, while likely to
increase the value of the trust, could also result in profound negative consequences for the Hershey community and surrounding areas, including, but not limited
to, the closing and/or withdrawal of Hershey Foods Corporation from the local community together with a dramatic loss of the region’s employment opportunities,
related businesses, and tax base.8
The petition then expressed the view that “the ultimate beneficiary and
real party in interest of all charitable trusts is the general public to
whom the social and economic advantages of the trusts accrue” and
declared, “Accordingly, the broad interests of the Attorney General
necessarily entail protecting the public against any social and economic
disadvantages which may be occasioned by the activities and functioning of public charities. . . .”9
The Orphans’ Court issued a preliminary injunction against the
stock sale, agreeing with the Attorney General that “[p]roperty given
to a charity is in a measure public property” and that “the Attorney
General has the authority to inquire into whether an exercise of a
trustee’s power, even if authorized under the trust instrument, is inimical to the public interest.”10 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
upheld the preliminary injunction.11
State Attorneys General and courts that overreach in the manner reflected in Hershey may discourage the creation of charities in their states
and even prompt an exodus of charities from their jurisdictions. Further8. Id. at ¶ 14 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at ¶ 18 (emphasis in original).
10. The opinion of the Orphans’ Court is reproduced at the end of the majority
opinion in Hershey, infra note 11, 807 A.2d at 327.
11. In re Milton Hershey School Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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more, in light of controversies like Hershey, creators of charities and
donors who contemplate contributing significant assets to charities are
well advised to keep a close eye on the regulatory environments in their
states. Finally, the example of Hershey counsels general vigilance against
administrative, legislative, and judicial parochialism in charity oversight.12

12. See generally Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social Utility of
the Private Foundation, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’CY 355 (2006). Schramm
notes that once attorneys general become involved,
. . . the record shows that the scope of state investigation and action
has far exceeded the common law power to ensure that funds
within a foundation are being applied in the public interest. Furthermore, the vagueness of most state charity statutes allows investigations to proceed as though the attorney general actually
possessed the authority to ensure that funds are used in the subjectively-determined “best” interest of the public.
Id. at 412–13. Schramm concludes by calling for “an implicit private-public
treaty among donors, trustees, and the government” and adds,
The burden also falls on the donor and trustees to not tempt government to examine the actions of the foundation and potentially
restrict its freedom. . . . [F]oundations must articulate programs
that, using a wide perspective, advance human welfare in the context of democratic capitalism. For its part, government generally
ought to defer to the trustees and executives, with four exceptions: egregious cases of frivolous action, instances where foundation resources are diverted for private gain, programs that set out
to erode or destroy aspects of our system of democratic capitalism, or instances where foundation resources are used to advance
political ends.
Attorneys general must refrain from adopting the convenient
notion that foundations are to operate democratically under the
direction of either constituent groups or elected officials. Such an
approach not only offends the historical theory of foundation
freedom of action but also trades away the potential such organizations possess for long term fundamental change (since that
change may offend current political sensibilities).
Id. at 413–14.
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Chapter II:
The “State Actors” Claim
The fact that foundations and other charities have state charters does not alone make these organizations “state actors”
or governmental or quasi-governmental entities accountable
as such to the public.
Nonprofit corporations, like business corporations, cannot exist without
state charters. In the nonprofit context, three types of legal consequences
have, from time to time, been asserted to flow from this fact: that the
state can dictate a nonprofit’s charitable purposes and governance structures and even claim its assets; that the nonprofit is a state actor subject
to constitutional constraints that apply to government; and that the nonprofit is a quasi-governmental entity subject to public “right to know”
statutes. However, precedents establish that the mere grant of a state
charter does not render a nonprofit a government agency, that foundations and charities enjoy the constitutional freedoms of association and
expression applicable to private persons, and that they are not subject
to the constitutional constraints on state actors or the public access laws
applicable to government and quasi-government entities.

A. The grant of a state charter does not
render a nonprofit corporation and its
assets subordinate to the state.
Most foundations and other charities exist by authority of state laws
allowing the formation and operation of nonprofit corporate enterprises. Nevertheless, as the New York State Court of Appeals held in a
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landmark ruling, the issuance of a charter to an organization is not to
be viewed as the state’s endorsement of the organization’s particular
purposes. Indeed, as the court recognized, the constitutional rights of
speech and association would lose their meaning if the state could withhold charters from organizations whose purposes were lawful but with
whose positions the state or a majority of the public disagreed.1
Moreover, notwithstanding the grant of a state charter, the selection
of the purposes and governance structures of a charitable trust or corporation remains committed to the discretion of private parties. In the
seminal 1819 case Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,2 the
Supreme Court held that the charter of a nonprofit corporation is a
contract protected by the Contracts Clause of the Constitution against
unilateral amendment by a state legislature. Rejecting an attempt by
the New Hampshire legislature to expand the number of directors of
the college and convert it to a university, Chief Justice John Marshall
stated that the legislature’s act “may be for the advantage of this college
in particular, and may be for the advantage of literature in general; but
it is not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of that
contract, on the faith of which their property was given.”3 The Court
noted pointedly that the purposes of the contributors, as stated in the

1.

2.
3.

Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 174 N.E.2d
487, 489, 490 (N.Y. 1961). The court declared that “approval of a corporate
charter devoted to . . . a purpose [to advocate for a change in the law or even
the form of government] does not imply approval of the views of its sponsors.
It simply means that their expression is lawful, and their sponsors entitled to a
vehicle for such expression under a statute which cannot constitutionally be
made available only to those who are in harmony with the majority viewpoint.
Dissenting organizations have equal rights, so far as freedom of expression is
concerned, as any other groups, and are entitled to an equal and objective application of the statute.” Id. at 490. See generally NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001).
17 U.S. 518 (1819). Today, such protection against impermissible state action
would likely be found under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 653.
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charter of the college, were “the promotion of [C]hristianity, and of
education generally, not the interests of New-Hampshire particularly.”4
Justice Joseph Story, in his influential concurring opinion, added,
“That the mere act of incorporation will not change the charity from
a private to a public one, is most distinctly asserted in the authority.”5
Justice Story explained:
The fact, then, that the [charitable purpose] is public, affords no proof that the corporation is also public; and,
consequently, the argument, so far as it is built on this
foundation, falls to the ground. If, indeed, it were correct, it would follow, that almost every hospital and college would be a public corporation; a doctrine utterly
irreconcilable with the whole current of decisions since
the time of Lord Coke.6
Justice Story based his view not only on precedent but on policy:
When the corporation is said [by the state] . . . to be public, it is not merely meant, that the whole community
may be the proper objects of the bounty, but that the
government have the sole right, as trustees of the public
interests, to regulate, control, and direct the public interests, to regulate, control, and direct the corporation,
and its funds and franchises, at its own good will and
pleasure. Now, such an authority does not exist in the
government, except where the corporation is in the
strictest sense public; that is, where the whole interests
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 640.
Id. at 660–61 (Story, J., concurring).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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and franchises are the exclusive property and domain of
the government itself.7
Justice Story’s understanding is essential to a political and economic
system founded on respect for the distinction between public and private and on the principle that governmental authority, absent the most
exigent circumstances, is subordinate to liberty and individual rights.
Without this understanding, as discussed further below, every person
who benefits from state decisions could be subject to the constitutional
constraints and to the transparency and accountability regimens that
apply to the state itself.
The state not only charters corporations, for-profit or nonprofit,
but it also retains regulatory powers over them. The state properly regulates the governance structures and practices of business corporations
to protect the interests of shareholders, just as the state regulates the governance structures and practices of nonprofit corporations in order to protect the purposes they serve and the legally recognized interests of donors
and members (if any). No one expresses doubt that for-profit corporations
are otherwise autonomous. Except as regulation is needed to ensure that
assets are used for charitable purposes and are protected from improper
fiduciary behavior or from being used for private benefit, foundations and
7.

Id. Justice Story added with some passion,
Yet, who ever thought before, that the munificent gifts of private
donors for general charity became instantaneously the property
of the government; and that the trustees appointed by the
donors, whether corporate or unincorporated, might be compelled to yield up their rights to whomsoever the government
might appoint to administer them? If we were to establish such
a principle, it would extinguish all future eleemosynary endowments; and we should find as little of public policy, as we now
find of law to sustain it.
Id.
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other charities should enjoy the same freedom of self-determination as do
business corporations—if not greater autonomy, because of the uniquely
important associational and non-market interests they serve.
Ultimately, the Constitution sets the outer bounds of state regulatory authority over nonprofits. Almost 140 years after Dartmouth College, the state of Maryland attempted to confiscate, through legislation,
assets that were dedicated to the benefit of the University of Maryland
system but were held by a separate nonprofit corporation. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland prevented the act of the legislature from taking effect.8 More recently, in a case discussed further below, the state of Illinois
claimed that an Illinois foundation created under specific legislation and
having public officials as board members was a part of the state, so that
the legislature could confiscate its assets for the state’s purposes. The Seventh Circuit refused to support the state’s claim and ruled that the legis-

8.

9.

In 1951, the Maryland legislature enacted a statute replacing the nine members
of the Endowment Fund of the University of Maryland, a nonprofit corporation,
with the Regents of the University of Maryland and persons that the Regents
might appoint. The Maryland high court ruled in Board of Regents of the University of Maryland v. Trustees of the Endowment Fund of the University of
Maryland, 112 A.2d 678 (Md. 1955), that the legislature had exceeded its authority in reserving to itself an absolute right to amend the Endowment’s charter
unilaterally. The court stated, “The reserved power is not unlimited and cannot
be exerted to defeat the purpose for which the corporate powers were granted . .
. or arbitrarily to make alterations that are inconsistent with the scope and object of the charter to destroy or impair any vested property right.” Id. at 682–83
(quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 634 (1936)). The court
held that the change made by the legislature altered a fundamental feature of the
endowment’s constitution: “The charter plan was designed to retain to the
donors, through the exercise of discretion by their chosen representatives and
their self-appointed successors, a voice in the management and expenditure of
the fund, subject, of course, to a veto power by the Regents. The views of this independent group may, from time to time, differ widely from those of the current
managers of the University.” Regents, 112 A.2d at 684.
Illinois Clean Energy Community Foundation v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934 (7th Cir.
2004). The foundation, with $225 million in assets, was established in 1999 by
Commonwealth Edison of Illinois under a state enabling statute as a condition
to the utility’s obtaining state approval to sell its seven fossil fuel plants. Under
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lature’s action was an impermissible taking.9 Citing Dartmouth College,
the court stated, “The fact that the state legislature authorized the creation
of the plaintiff foundation does not make the foundation a state agency;
for the legislature also authorizes the creation of business and professional
corporations, not to mention religious and charitable corporations, without thereby acquiring a right to confiscate such entities’ assets.”10
Thus, more is required than a state-issued charter before a nonprofit
enterprise can be treated as an arm of the state or as a quasi-governmental body.
the statute, the mission of the foundation is to make grants to public and private institutions in Illinois for projects to conserve energy and improve the environment. In 2003, the legislature sought to compel the foundation to “turn
over to the state’s treasury and state environmental agencies up to $125 million, which is to be used for funding the agencies and repaying state general
obligation bonds.” Judge Richard Posner ruled the legislative act to be an impermissible taking:
The coercive element in the history of the [original] authorizing
statute is irrelevant. Suppose the state didn’t think that lawyers
should be permitted to incorporate, and passed a law requiring
that all professional corporations of lawyers be converted to
partnerships. Would the partnership assets be public property?
Obviously not. Supposing the state could indeed have forced
ComEd to disgorge $125 million of its profits from the sale of
the power plants, or indeed much more, to the ratepayers,
could it then, years later, have ordered the ratepayers to contribute their rebates to the state treasury, on the ground that it
was really the state’s money? We cannot see what difference it
makes that the disgorgement was to a foundation rather than
to individuals. By forcing a transfer of private property from
one private entity to another, the state did not destroy the private character of the property. If the state orders a criminal to
make restitution of a sum of money to the victim of his crime,
it cannot snatch the money back from the victim on the ground
that it’s the state’s money.
Id. at 936.
10. Id. “This suit would go nowhere,” Judge Posner added, “had the statute creating the plaintiff foundation reserved the right of the state to confiscate the
foundation’s assets. There is no such reservation.” Id. Finally, he observed:
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B. In general, foundations and other
charities enjoy constitutional freedoms
of association and expression and are not
subject to the constitutional constraints
imposed on state actors.
A foundation or other charity that is properly characterized as a “state
actor” within the meaning of the constitutional jurisprudence would
be subject to constitutional constraints on governmental action. In such
a case, the foundation or other charity could be held liable for violating
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment (applicable to action by one of the states) or the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applicable to federal action)
or some other constitutional constraint on government.
These constitutional constraints and potential liabilities arise only
from official action; they ordinarily do not apply to private persons,
including entities.11 Thus, within certain limits, private organizations
All the state is left to argue is that the appointment of five-sixths
of the foundation’s trustees by state officials made the foundation
a state agency. Not so. By whomever appointed, the trustees of
a charitable foundation have a fiduciary duty to conserve the
foundation’s assets. . . . It would be a fiction therefore to suggest
that because public officials appoint most of the trustees, the
state “controls” the foundation. If it really controlled it, we
wouldn’t have this lawsuit.
Id. at 937–38 (citations omitted).
11. Separately, a federal civil rights statute provides that no person acting “under
color of any statute . . . of any State” shall deprive another of any right, privilege or immunity “secured by the Constitution and the laws” of the United
States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If a defendant’s conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes action
“under color of state law” for § 1983 purposes. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982). See the discussion below, note 18, of Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale College, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000). See also a variety
of other specific federal and state nondiscrimination statutes, such as the New
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normally can operate in all their fractious and insular splendor, free of
what Nancy Rosenblum has called the “logic of congruence”—that is,
the demand that “the internal life and organization of associations mirror liberal democratic principles and practices.”12 Importantly, while
some may not approve of or agree with the membership structure and
purposes of some expressive associations, as members of the public all
of us are free to criticize and press for change in such policies, but the
desire for democratic norms here cannot be backed by legal compulsion.13
Despite the choices made by some organizations, the resulting variety is desirable. Its availability is a spur to philanthropy and participation. Private organizations can adopt their own rules of internal
decision-making, such as rules denying some members the right to vote
or granting some members greater voting power than others. Such
groups can exercise the power of exile through their right to expel
members who break their rules. A member who is unhappy with a
group’s policy and unable to persuade the group to change it can always exercise the power of exit and form another group.14 Nonprofits
can and do form on all sides or no side of contentious issues and are
protected in doing so. We value, as Justice Lewis Powell famously

Jersey statute applicable to “places of public accommodation” at issue in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, infra note 13, discussed below.
12. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM
IN AMERICA 36–41 (1998). See generally Brody, Entrance, Voice and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821 (2002).
13. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding the right of
the Boy Scouts of America to expel a troop leader who is homosexual). As described in Chapter III, below, tighter limitations are generally permitted regarding tax-exemption. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
576 (1983) (as a matter of statutory interpretation, ruling that a university engaging in racial discrimination is not entitled to exemption under Code §
501(c)(3)). See also note 34, infra, and accompanying text.
14. Compare the market power of a dissatisfied donor who withholds future contributions.
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stated, “the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging
diverse, often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints.”15
We accept the high transaction costs that come with dissension and
with entering and exiting associations because the alternative—the
obliteration of differences—has still higher costs, in the form of reduced
autonomy and liberty.16
However, litigation arises from time to time about whether a particular private entity can properly be treated as a state actor, and thus subject to the constitutional constraints and potential liabilities that apply
to government. Acknowledging the difficulty of making a state-actor
determination, the Supreme Court has discussed the controlling policy:
Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject
to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct
(however exceptionable) that is not. The judicial obligation is not only to “‘preserve an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law’ and avoid the
imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it
could not control,” but also to assure that constitutional
standards are invoked “when it can be said that the State
is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to
be displaced, therefore, its ambit cannot be a simple line
15. Bob Jones University, supra note 13, 461 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
16. After Boy Scouts, the simultaneous exercise of voice and exit dramatically illustrated the benefits and costs of the freedom to associate. Some parents withdrew their sons from the Boy Scouts; some municipalities have sought to
terminate the Scouts’ right to use public facilities; reform Jewish leaders recommended ending troop sponsorship; local United Ways have debated terminating support; some troops defied the restriction, and were expelled, but a local
council in another state agreed with its United Way funder not to discriminate.
A new association for boys that does not discriminate against gays—Scouting
for All—sprang up.
42

Evelyn Brody and John Tyler

between States and people operating outside formally
governmental organizations, and the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual is to be treated
sometimes as if a State had caused it to be performed.
Thus, we say that state action may be found if, though
only if, there is such a “close nexus between the State
and the challenged action” that seemingly private behavior “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”17
The consequences of being characterized as a state actor could be catastrophic to a foundation or other charity, and broadly characterizing foundations and other charities as state actors would be revolutionary in terms
of the traditional relationships between such organizations and government. Accordingly, courts have insisted on a fact-intensive, case-by-case
analysis of the issue, refusing to approve any categorical assertions that
foundations and other charities are subject to state actor constraints. Furthermore, under the criteria developed and applied by the courts, it is the
rare foundation or other charity that would qualify as such.
Courts have almost uniformly refrained from holding that a foundation or other charity is a state actor merely because it is state-chartered or tax-exempt or receives and expends public funds or has public
officials on its board of directors. However, certain classes of nonprofits
are particularly vulnerable to treatment as state actors—notably, nonprofits performing “public functions” that are “so clearly governmental
in nature that the state cannot be permitted to escape responsibility by
allowing them to be managed by a supposedly private agency.”18 These
17. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
295 (2001) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
18. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968). In Hack v. President and Fellows
of Yale College, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit ruled that Yale
University was not a state actor or instrumentality, and so did not violate plaintiffs’ religious rights protected under the Constitution and § 1983 by requiring all
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cases might include, for example, organizations such as public hospitals
and museums that were spun off by the state. Typically, under the enabling legislation or governing documents of such organizations, some
or all of the directors are government officials or their appointees; funds
come from the state, directly or through low-cost or no-cost financing;
and the organization is required—if not under either the enabling
statute or the governing documents, then under an umbrella statute applicable to quasi-public bodies—to follow government rules in matters
like compensation and employment.
The issue of whether grant-making foundations amount to state actors arose in the early 1970s in an idiosyncratic case in which a private
plaintiff sued 13 western New York charitable foundations, alleging
racial discrimination against himself, his children, and his foundation.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant foundations, for reasons of
race, had refused to hire him as a director, refused to give his children
scholarships, and refused to give grants to his foundation.19 The plaintiff also alleged a pattern of discriminatory employment and investment
by the defendant foundations.20 He sought injunctive and declaratory
unmarried freshmen and sophomores under the age of 21 to reside in college dormitories, all of which are co-educational; nor did Yale’s refusal to exempt religious observers from co-educational housing violate the Fair Housing Act, 41
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Because Yale is so old that it came into being by a specific
statute, the Hack court followed a 1995 Supreme Court case setting forth the test
for such a corporation: “[O]nly if (1) the government created the corporate entity
by special law, (2) the government created the entity to further governmental objectives, and (3) the government retains ‘permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of the corporation’ will the corporation be deemed a
government entity for the purpose of the state action requirement.” 237 F.3d at
83–84 (citation omitted). The Hack court ruled, “Here, the first two factors are
easily satisfied: the State of Connecticut created the corporate entity by special
law, and higher education is a governmental objective (although not the exclusive
province of government). Two of nineteen board members is, however, a long
way from control.” Moreover, the court added, “It is equally clear that the state
could not control Yale’s policies and operations even if it chose to become involved. Yale, as a private university, did not act under color of law.” Id. at 84.
19. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1974).
20. Id.
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relief, damages, the revocation of defendants’ tax exemptions, and an
order directing the defendants to surrender all of their assets to the U.S.
Treasury.21
A panel of the Second Circuit refused to dismiss the case, remanding
it for further proceedings. In doing so, the panel enumerated a list of
factors that should be taken into account in determining whether a private entity is a state actor:
(1) the degree to which the “private” organization is dependent on governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory scheme; (3)
whether that scheme connotes government approval of
the activity or whether the assistance is merely provided
to all without such connotation; (4) the extent to which
the organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the State; (5) whether the organization has legitimate claims to recognition as a “private” association
in associational or other constitutional terms.22
The panel found that the Internal Revenue Code subjected the defendant foundations to close regulation. Furthermore, the panel, in contrast with other authorities, seemed to characterize the foundations’ tax
exemptions as marks of specific government approval. The panel stated:
The exemptions in question . . . are not the type of government assistance such as police or fire protection,
which is routinely provided to all without any connotation of approval. Organizations must apply for exempt
status. Moreover, the acts of application and approval

21. Id.
22. Id. at 629.
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are not value neutral. In effect, the government would
appear to be certifying that every foundation on its taxexempt list is laboring in the public interest.23
However, the panel limited the reach of its holding by stating that its
“definition of ‘state action’ is applicable only to claims of racial discrimination. . . . [C]onduct which is admittedly part private and part
governmental must be more strictly scrutinized when claims of racial
discrimination are made.”24
Statler Foundation lives on in the jurisprudence less for the panel’s
holding and discussion than for Judge Henry Friendly’s widely cited
dissent from the full Second Circuit’s denial of a rehearing.25 Judge
Friendly argued that the panel had been too open to characterizing
foundations and other charities as state actors. Indeed, he termed the
panel’s opinion “the most ill-advised decision with respect to ‘state action’ yet rendered by any court” and called it a holding that “unless
corrected will be the source of enormous damage to the great edifice
of private philanthropy which has been one of this country’s most distinctive and admirable features.”26
Judge Friendly’s dissent echoed the view of Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (discussed in Chapter III) and gave
his own opinion as to the limited effects of a tax exemption:
Because of its broad availability, a tax exemption, in itself, has never previously been thought to impose the
23. Id. at 633 (citations and footnote omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 637 et seq. (Friendly, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en
banc). Judge Friendly’s opinion was joined by two of the three other dissenters.
26. Id. at 636–37. Judge Friendly noted that the dissent did not apply to the denial
of rehearing with respect to the Buffalo Foundation, a majority of whose
board was appointed by public officials. Id. at 637 n. 1.
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government’s imprimatur sufficiently to convert the recipient into a de facto arm of the government. An exemption or other tax benefit, available to a wide range
of institutions, has always been regarded as the least possible form of government support, except for the police
and fire protection provided all citizens.27
His dissent also emphasized the need to protect the value of foundation
activities and practices and the danger of imposing unnecessary constraints on such activities:
The interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice
for private philanthropy is very great. Even among philanthropic institutions, the activities of charitable family
foundations, receiving no government benefit other than
tax exemption, should be the last to be swept, under a
“sifting of facts and exercise of judgment,” within the
concept of state action. There are hundreds of thousands
of foundations ranging from the giants to the pygmies.
While most foundations, particularly large ones, give
mainly to institutions serving all races and creeds, although hardly in the completely non-discriminatory way
required of public institutions, I see nothing offensive,
either constitutionally or morally, in a foundation’s
choosing to give preferentially or even exclusively to Je27. Id. at 638. Judge Friendly also dismissed the panel’s view that the defendant
foundations, as tax-exempt foundations, were “closely regulated.” He argued,
“The ‘state action’ cases that have stressed the heavy presence of government
regulation are those in which private institutions are carrying out state policy
against the plaintiffs or in which the state is benefiting directly from the private
activity.” He added, “Private action does not become state action simply because
government regulation has not gone so far as a plaintiff would like.” Id. at 639.
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suit seminaries, to Yeshivas, to black colleges or to the
NAACP. Indeed, I find it something of a misnomer to
apply the pejorative term “racial discrimination” to a
failure to make a charitable gift.28
Judge Friendly’s dissent also cautioned that donors “are not going to
be willing to spend their time and money, or to have directors and staffs
of foundations spend theirs, in defending actions like this one. If the
federal courts take over the supervision of philanthropy, there will ultimately be no philanthropy to supervise.”29 Finally, he expressed grave
concern that the panel’s decision “will spawn countless civil rights suits
against charitable foundations by disgruntled minority applicants, add
unnecessarily to the crushing burden on the district courts and the
courts of appeals, and, worst of all, seriously discourage private philanthropy by subjecting donors to the necessity of justifying their decisions in court.”30
The dissent noted that “several of the defendant foundations commendably have given liberally to black and other minority causes”; but
even this record would not save them, “and many others in later suits,
from the necessity of full factual exploration and explanation of just
what they have done over the years, with the attendant burdens on
foundation directors and staffs and the courts.”31
Fortunately, Judge Friendly’s warning seems to have been heeded.
Partly because of the unusual nature of the Statler Foundation case and
partly because of the force of Judge Friendly’s dissent, later cases citing
the Statler Foundation factors have almost always found that the pri-

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 639–40.
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.
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vate entity in question was not a state actor.32 Moreover, after Statler
Foundation, the Supreme Court “tightened the proof for a showing of
state action.”33 With the Bob Jones case, the debate over racially discriminatory schools, the issue raised by Statler Foundation, shifted
from the question of whether such entities violate private plaintiffs’
rights to the question of whether the defendant foundations are entitled
to federal tax exemption as a matter of congressional intent. Indeed,
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bob Jones cited Judge Friendly’s Statler
Foundation dissent.34

C. Foundations and other charities generally are not subject to public access laws.
Even if a nonprofit organization is not subject to constitutional constraints as a state actor, it might be treated as a quasi-governmental
public body, a broader category, under one or more state or federal
“sunshine laws.” However, open meetings and open records laws that
are intended to ensure effective oversight of government do not generally apply to foundations and other charities under the criteria established by legislatures.

32. See, e.g., Gilinsky v. Columbia University, 488 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). The Statler Foundation suit itself eventually foundered when the pro se
plaintiff failed to pursue the case. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 1975 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11389, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5579, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
P9721 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
33. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1191–92
(citation omitted) (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1011 (1982)). See also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). In addition, it is
rare that would-be beneficiaries of private philanthropy have standing to sue
for largess or to challenge the tax-exempt status of an organization. See generally Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of
Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183 (2007).
34. Bob Jones, supra note 13, 461 U.S. at 610.
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Although the application of public access statutes has been frequently litigated, courts have shown no reluctance to reject suits that
seek records held by typically private institutions. For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled against the application of
the state’s public records law to Harvard University.35
However, two general types of nonprofits are particularly vulnerable to these sunshine laws. First are those government-created nonprofits (perhaps also vulnerable to state-actor claims) that should not be
allowed to evade the public’s rightful access to information simply because government has placed their functions under nominally private
management.
In a second category are “state-institution-related foundations,”
private entities that raise funds for the benefit of public bodies such as
state universities. (Notably, there is a recent trend for this type of foundation to supplement, or even pay most of, the salary of the supported
state university’s president or certain athletic coaches.) Media organizations often probe private contributions to these foundations to discover what the private donors might be getting in return.36

35. Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 840
N.E.2d 518 (Mass. 2006).
36. Cases holding nonprofit organizations subject to state open records laws include State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Foundation, 602 N.E.2d
1159 (Ohio 1992) (defendant was a “public office” required to produce names
of donors); Gannon v. Board of Regents of the State of Iowa, 692 N.W.2d 31
(Iowa 2005) (similar); Champ v. Poelker, 755 S.W.2d 383, 390-93 (Mo. App.
1988) (convention and visitors bureau performed public functions and was
quasi-governmental body). Recently, in Cape Publications, Inc. v. University of
Louisville Foundation, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 818 (Ky. 2008), the court held that the
defendant was a public agency. Because the public’s interest in the operations of
the university’s fundraising arm generally outweighed donor privacy interests,
the foundation was required to disclose the names of 47,000 donors. However,
the court upheld the privacy rights of 62 donors who had requested anonymity
at a time when the foundation had not yet been determined to be a public entity
for purposes of the State Open Records Act. Id. at 823. For an unsuccessful
suit, see Lee Publications, Inc. v. Dickinson School of Law, 848 A.2d 178 (Pa.
50

Evelyn Brody and John Tyler

State-institution-related foundations raise issues of private access to and
control over public assets, including intangible assets such as the public
institution’s name and goodwill; the foundations’ role in managing gifts,
investments, and campus facilities; and their role in the governance of
the related public institutions. Most contentious is the issue of information about the names and contribution levels of individual donors, because the donors have opposing privacy interests in protecting their
personal financial information and organizational associations.37
Whether an entity is held subject to state public access laws will
usually depend on a combination of factors; generally, no one factor is
determinative.38 These factors include the following: (1) whether the
organization primarily performs a public function, including performance under an agreement with the government; (2) whether it was created by a specific statute; (3) whether it exercises powers of
government, such as the power to tax or enact policies or rules that affect citizens as citizens; (4) whether its board is composed of public officials or their appointees; (5) the extent to which the entity’s revenue
stream is comprised of public funds; (6) whether a public agency pre-

Commw. Ct. 2004) (rejecting a suit by a newspaper group against a nonprofit
corporation that was formed to monitor and enforce the terms of a merger of a
private law school into a state university). See also University of Connecticut v.
Freedom of Information Commission, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 996 (2010),
appeal pending (rejecting the claim of the plaintiff, who was establishing a new
booster club, to obtain the public university’s lists of customers and existing and
potential supporters, generally finding these to be trade secrets).
37. The Internal Revenue Code resolves the tension between privacy and disclosure interests by providing that Forms 990, including information about
donors to private foundations, are subject to public disclosure; but the identities of donors to public charities, though included in the filings with the IRS,
are exempt from public disclosure.
38. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that such
an organization was not public even though it was created by a state enabling
statute, received dedicated funds from public sources, and had a board including public officials or their appointees. See Illinois Clean Energy, supra note 9,
392 F.3d at 935, 936.
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viously operated the entity’s facilities or provided the services that the
entity now provides; (7) whether government action is necessary to dissolve the entity or divest it of assets; (8) whether the entity’s employees
are government employees, receive government benefits, or are eligible
to participate in programs for its employees; and (9) whether the entity
must comply with state audit requirements or maintain its money on
deposit with the state.39
Courts that have found private organizations subject to public access
laws have done so only after applying these factors to the organization’s
specific structure and operations. In such an inquiry, most foundations
and other charities would not satisfy these factors or any significant subset of them. Thus, while particular foundations or other charities and
their purposes have been found sufficiently public to be subject to public
access laws, this fact does not support any categorical claim that such
organizations are by their nature subject to such laws—or even a claim
that most foundations or other charities are subject to such laws.

39. See cases cited supra note 36.
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Chapter III:
The Public-Money
Argument
The existence of the federal tax exemption and charitable tax
deduction does not support the public-money argument.
Foundations and other charities generally are not required to pay income, property, or other taxes.1 Furthermore, donors who itemize their
deductions are permitted, within certain limits, to deduct the value of
their charitable contributions in computing their taxable income.2 As
a result of these tax preferences, governments forgo tax money that
they would otherwise collect. From these facts, advocates of the
public-money theory argue that the forgone amounts are subsidies to
foundations and other charities from government. It follows from this
view that government—whether viewed as the grantor of subsidies or
as a donor—is justified in dictating the choice or focus of foundations’
or other charities’ missions, mandating details of governance, determining programmatic and operational effectiveness, and intervening in
other aspects of internal operations.
In a corollary to this position, some contend that foundations and
other charities, in exchange for government tax benefits, are obligated
to deliver services—or in some cases products—that would otherwise
be the responsibility of government. This quid pro quo argument de1. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 509(a); as to property-tax exemption, see many state
constitutions and the statutes of most states.
2. I.R.C. § 170. Corporations, too, may generally deduct their charitable
contributions.
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mands, at a minimum, that nonprofits provide quantifiable, objective
benefits to the public in amounts at least equal to the amount of the
forgone taxes.3 In addition, some variants of the argument would require charities to use certain quotas or “fair shares” of their resources
for purposes determined by the public or government.4 In other variants of the quid pro quo argument, a charity would be required to pursue particular purposes or activities that government determines to be
desirable, possibly even to the exclusion of other purposes and activities
also charitable under federal and state laws.5
However, these quid pro quo and tax-treatment arguments fail for
at least five reasons: (1) the nature of the covenant that underlies the
tax preferences; (2) the inconsistent tax policy implications of viewing
the favored treatment of charitable activity differently from the favored
treatment of individual or business activity; (3) the substantial presence
of inarguably private dollars among foundation and other charities’ assets; (4) the incongruity inherent in treating organizations that engage
only passively with government more harshly than organizations with
direct, active relationships with government; and (5) the right of foundations and other charities to be free of government-imposed unconstitutional conditions.
3. See Suzanne Perry, Paying It Forward—and Back, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHOPY,
Sept. 2, 2008 (reporting arguments to this effect by Sen. Charles Grassley (RIowa) and Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Cal.)) (available at http://philanthropy.com/
article/Paying-It-Forward-/60724/).
4. See Makani Themba-Nixon, Can Counting Really Make the Difference?, in
PHILANTHROPIC INITIATIVE FOR RACIAL EQUITY, 1 CRITICAL ISSUES FORUM: MEASURING WHAT WE VALUE 14, 15 (2008); Arturo Vargas, Data Collection is an
Important Tool for Building a More Vibrant Nonprofit Sector, 1 CRITICAL ISSUES FORUM, supra, at 16, 17; BRADLEY CENTER, HUDSON INSTITUTE, MANDATING MULTICULTURAL MUNIFICENCE?, Transcript of Proceedings (April 7, 2008)
(comments by John Gamboa and Pablo Eisenberg). See also JOEL FLEISHMAN,
THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET; HOW PRIVATE WEALTH IS
CHANGING THE WORLD 52 (2007).
5. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, “Introduction” note 14.
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A. The covenant underlying the exchange
of federal tax preferences for charitable
activity requires that exempt charities
dedicate their assets to, and use them in
furtherance of, charitable purposes and
not for private benefit.
Congressional legislation in the form of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the federal tax treatment of charities. The federal tax exemption for foundations and other charities derives from Code section
501(c)(3). Entities are exempt if they are organized and operated for
certain prescribed purposes and do not allow impermissible private
benefit, more than insubstantial efforts to influence legislation,6 or intervention in political campaigns. The deductibility of charitable contributions is found in Code section 170, which essentially repeats the
criteria of section 501(c)(3).
There is ongoing debate about the reasons for the enactment and
maintenance of the tax-favored treatment of foundations and other
charities. The debate includes the question of whether the tax benefits
are properly categorized as a subsidy or tax expenditure or whether
they instead represent a view that charitable income falls outside the
tax base as properly defined.7 The tax-favored treatment of charitable
6. Under Code § 4945 and corresponding regulations, the limitations on private
foundations’ ability to influence legislation are more restrictive than are the
limits on public charities.
7. For discussion of this debate, and of the complexities of both the subsidy and
base-defining approaches, see Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998). Notably, the “tax
expenditure budget” prepared by the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation calculates the forgone taxes from the charitable contribution deduction
and from tax-exempt bonds issued by nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, but views the income tax exemption of charities as part of the properly determined tax base. Thus, current federal tax policy for charitable activity
combines the subsidy and base-defining approaches.
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organizations has also been justified on the more general ground that
such organizations serve higher purposes deserving of encouragement
as a matter of law and policy and should not be financially inhibited
by taxation of their income.8
Under the narrow quid pro quo theory of exemption, the state bestows the exemption and forgoes tax revenues while the charity reciprocates by (at a minimum) fulfilling obligations that those tax revenues
would have enabled the state to meet.9 However, this rationale fails to
explain the fact that neither the income-tax exemption nor the charitable deduction is limited to organizations that lessen the burdens of
government.10 Instead, the exemption extends to many organizations

8. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 682 (2001) (citing discussion by Sen. Henry French
Hollis (D-N.H.) of the War Revenue Act of 1917, 55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1935)).
9. See Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV.
419, 430 & n.34 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860 at 19 (1937)); John D.
Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 862 (1993);
Laurens Williams & Donald V. Morehead, An Analysis of the Federal Tax Distinctions Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations (1975), in IV
FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, “Introduction” note 6, at 2099, 2112
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860 at 20 (1937)).
10. Some state property-tax regimes require an exempt charity to reduce the burdens of government as well as to provide some (unspecified) level of benefits to
those who cannot afford any fees charged by the charity. See generally Brody,
The States’ Growing Use of a Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale for the Charity Property Tax Exemption, 56 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 269 (June, 2007). The subsidy
theory, in whatever form, places charities in a position subordinate to that of
the state, which can determine the size and nature of the burdens that charities
are required to relieve. It has been suggested that a state, to the extent it is unhappy with or uninterested in subsidizing certain activities, can simply finetune its property tax exemption for this purpose. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 598–600 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Brody, ed., PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (2002); Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property-Tax
Exempt, but Some Charities Are More Exempt Than Others, 44 NEW ENGLAND
L. REV. 621 (2010).
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whose activities are not the responsibility of government in the first
place, including not just churches (in whose activities government is
constitutionally prohibited from engaging) but also many associational
and other nonprofit organizations. Even the broader versions of the
quid pro quo approach typically look principally to a type of monetary
or quasi-monetary exchange, asking only, “What are we as a society
getting in exchange for the tax-favored treatment we bestow?”11 The
approach often discounts and neglects the intangible benefits provided
by foundations and other charities.
It is not only the quid pro quo approach that is oversimplified and
incomplete; each of the major theories of the tax exemption and charitable deduction is unable to explain some salient features of nonprofit
tax law and policy. For example, if we view the exemption as part of
the proper definition of the tax base, why, as a matter of tax policy, is
the exemption for charitable activity available only to organizations and
not to individuals, and why is the charitable deduction only available
for contributions to organizations and not to individuals?12 Under either
the subsidy or the tax-base theories, why do we limit lobbying or ban
political activity even though a particular charitable purpose might be
best accomplished through legislative or political change? The most
11. Perry, supra note 3; Ray D. Madoff, Dog Eat Your Taxes?, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2008; Howard Husock, Nobody Does It Better, Op-Ed, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 24, 2008. It does not appear that any court following the quid pro quo
approach has actually quantified the required relationship between forgone
taxes and benefits received by the public. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of
New York, 397 U.S. 644, 676 (1970).
12. See Colombo, Marketing, supra note 8, at 682. Theory aside, there are practical explanations for the fact that we do not allow individual income from charitable activities to be tax-exempt and do not allow charitable deductions for
contributions to individuals. For example, it is much harder to hold an individual accountable for ensuring that he or she pursues charitable purposes and
does not engage in private benefit transactions. To some extent, the inefficiencies and possible inequities of the current distinctions are the price of achieving
a higher degree of oversight and accountability.
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thorough and nuanced analysis to date of the very complicated U.S. tax
treatment of charities explains this treatment by referring to a variety
of policy goals, grouped under the headings of the support function (i.e.,
subsidy), the equity function (notably including redistribution), the regulatory function (imposing constraints on managerial behavior), and
the “border patrol” function (maintaining the distinction between charities, on the one hand, and business and government, on the other).13
One reason for some of the theoretical difficulties in determining
the basis of the tax-favored treatment of charities is the absence of substantive evidence in the legislative record of the enactment of and modifications to the exemption and charitable deduction. Because of this
near-vacuum, theories have been developed and documented after the
fact. Some scholars argue that the evidentiary void does not pose such
difficulties and in fact is wholly unremarkable, reflecting deference to
the widespread belief that the desirability of exemption is self-evident.14
The income tax enacted during the Civil War, which applied only
to specific types of corporations, did not contain an exemption for
charities. Accompanying the passage of the first general corporate income tax in 1894, however, was an express desire that charitable organizations should not “suffer under the bill”; thus, the exemption was
allowed and has appeared in every such income-tax bill since that
time.15 The allowance of a charitable deduction in the 1917 income tax
13. John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK
267–306 (Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg, eds., 2d ed. 2006).
14. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 301 (1976). The authors state that there is only cursory explanation by legislators, commentators
are “almost equally silent,” and the paucity of explanation “may have reflected
a conviction that the wisdom of tax exemption was self-evident, and the basic
policy was politically invulnerable to change, or that taxation in this area
would bring in little revenue.” But see Brody, Of Sovereignty, supra note 7;
Belknap, “Introduction” note 6.
15. See Brody, Of Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 605; Belknap, “Introduction,”
supra note 6, at 2025.
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bill was justified by the burden that high wartime marginal tax rates
imposed on patriotically generous donors who otherwise might no
longer be able to support the equally patriotic American Red Cross.16
What is clear from the legislative history is the absence of evidence of
either a specific “original bargain” apart from the terms of the legislation
itself or of any other explanation for the charitable exemption and deduction. This near void of evidence provides significant support for the
idea that due deference must be given to the practices that have governed
the relations between charities and government throughout American history and the preceding English history. The absence of evidence of an
extra-legislative, let alone quantifiable, bargain also provides significant
support for the idea that the preferred treatment of foundations and other
charities is based not simply on quantifiable benefits they may provide
but on the recognition that charities benefit society in both financial and
non-financial ways that are of fundamental importance. One scholar has
referred to the “metabenefits” that accrue to society from the manner in
which foundations and other charities produce their goods or deliver their
services.17 Among the metabenefits he notes are a spirit of volunteerism,
pluralism, initiative, and experimentation, as well as an educated population.18 These values should never be disregarded in adopting law or policy; doing so could cause unintended harm to our civil society.
Although it is not clear how the original covenant between government and foundations and other charities should be characterized—
whether as a subsidy or tax expenditure, an exclusion from the proper
definition of tax base, a combination of the two, or something else—it
is possible to enumerate the conditions and obligations that the Code

16. See John A. Wallace & Robert W. Fisher, The Charitable Deduction Under Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (1975), in IV FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 6, at 2129, 2131–32.
17. Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities:
Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 402–03 (1997).
18. Id.
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has imposed on foundations, other charities and donors and that they
all have accepted. The most important obligation is that charitable organizations commit their missions and operations to charitable purposes within the meaning of the Code and corresponding Treasury
regulations, judicial interpretations, and administrative guidance. In
addition, exempt organizations agree to public disclosure requirements
designed to allow government and the public to hold these organizations accountable for meeting these obligations. Among the disclosure
requirements are the filing of a tax information return, including information about the organizations’ finances, and agreeing to the public
availability of that return.19
Public charities must make sure to avoid “excess benefit” transactions with insiders by complying with the requirements of Code section
4958. Private foundations operate under even tighter restrictions that
include a mandatory minimum payout rate, a variable tax on investment
income, disclosure of specific investments and the identities of their
donors, and prohibitions on “self-dealing” transactions (other than the
payment of reasonable compensation for services), excess business holdings, investments jeopardizing their missions, and certain other transactions such as impermissible lobbying and political activity.20
While the wisdom of the extent or design of the statutory constraints may be—and is—debated, the requirements are clearly legitimate within the tax exemption system defined by the specific terms of
§ 501(c)(3), which focuses on ensuring that the activities of exempt organizations are charitable rather than private. Beyond ensuring this
principle, the restrictions do not impinge on foundations’ or other charities’ governance, structure, operations, or decision-making. The law
treats these matters as internal to charitable organizations and generally
commits them to the organizations’ discretion as autonomous entities.
19. I.R.C. § 6033, Returns by Exempt Organizations; I.R.C. § 6104, Publicity of
Information Required from Certain Exempt Organizations and Certain Trusts.
20. See I.R.C. Chapter 42.
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Therefore, to the extent that a covenant exists between charities,
donors, and the Congress (or charities and the states, to the extent of
analogous state provisions), the bargain may be summarized as follows:
Organizations that are exempt from taxation, and that may receive
charitable contributions for which donors are allowed tax deductions,
commit themselves, under section 501(c)(3) (or similar state law), to
using their assets and resources to further charitable exempt purposes
and not for private benefit. The commitment includes compliance with
statutes and regulations that provide more detailed guidance about
what constitutes charitable activity and what does not. Compliance includes the obligation to provide the information required to demonstrate specific compliance with section 501(c)(3) (and state law).
As a matter of law, the covenant does not otherwise compromise
or undermine the inherent private character of these organizations and
their entitlement to autonomy and independence.

B. Individuals and businesses benefit from
tax-favored treatment and direct transactions with government. Their assets and resources do not thereby become public, and
they are not thereby transformed into governmental entities. Foundations and other
charities should be viewed no differently.
Throughout American history, governments at all levels have used tax
abatements and other tax incentives to encourage certain activities.21
In the early years of the republic, state governments made no sector
distinctions in bestowing and withholding tax subsidies: In New Eng21. See Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV.
433, 440 (1996).
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land, for example, canal, turnpike, bridge, and manufacturing companies enjoyed the same types of tax exemption that were granted to
eleemosynary entities like Yale College. In recent history, during the
first wave of tax reform under President Ronald Reagan, certain sectors
of the business community actually enjoyed negative income tax rates
through the combination of accelerated depreciation and investment
tax credits for new equipment. Yet those business assets are not viewed
as public or governmental, and any limits imposed on their independence have not derived from their tax-favored treatment.
There is a long list of tax-favored treatments—such as deductions,
exclusions from income, credits, exemptions, abatements, and deferrals—that various levels of government afford to individuals and businesses for reasons other than the proper measurement of income,
without impairing or prejudicing the underlying autonomy and private
nature of the beneficiaries of such treatment. For example, individuals
enjoy deductions for the mortgage interest and property taxes they pay
on their homes; the exclusion of all or most of their gain on the sale of
their principal residences; deductions or exclusions for retirement contributions, health insurance, and tuition; and tax credits for higher education, dependent care, and children.22 Government does not claim
that it is thereby entitled to dictate the lifestyles, consumption and savings patterns, childbearing and child-rearing choices, furniture tastes,
or college majors and courses of study, or to make any other such decisions for individuals who claim these deductions and credits.
22. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 407, 416 (1999) (tax expenditure analysis poses challenges to
home mortgage deduction, child tax credit, and earned income tax). The list of
additional tax preferences is long (e.g., exclusion of scholarships from income,
I.R.C. § 117; tuition tax credit, I.R.C. § 25A; limited interest deduction for education loans, I.R.C. § 221; interest exclusion for Education Savings Bonds
used for tuition payments, I.R.C. § 135(a)). See Colombo, Marketing, supra
note 8, at 660; Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and
Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 705–13 (1999).
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Businesses also benefit from tax-favored treatment designed to encourage certain activities that legislatures deem in the public interest
and worthy of public support. Examples of such tax provisions, excluding those necessary for the proper measurement of business profits,
include the research and development tax credit, accelerated depreciation deductions for equipment investment, tax credits for “green” activities, and tax benefits, such as tax increment financing, associated
with economic development. Government does not thereby claim to be
entitled to determine the nature of the underlying research or strategies
regarding the exploitation of the results, the timing of equipment upgrades, decisions about whether to merge with a competitor or draw
down a line of credit, choices about whether the board should have
five or nine directors, or whether the organization should be viewed as
doing well or poorly. These tax-favored treatments are not even contingent on the fundamental issue of whether the business is being efficiently or effectively run.
Conversely, when for-profit enterprises are regulated, it is not their
tax-favored treatment that is invoked to justify or support regulation.
Laws and regulations in areas such as securities, banking, and the environment do not depend on the tax-favored treatment of the regulated
enterprises. For instance, securities and commodities trading laws have
their origin in the fact that markets in these areas were uneven playing
fields whose inefficiencies threatened the underlying stability of capital
markets as a whole.23 Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted because of fraudulent
behavior that destroyed prominent businesses and the accompanying
jobs, savings, and investments. In the wake of the 2008 economic meltdown, the discussions of greater regulation of the banking industry have
involved not the tax preferences enjoyed by the industry but the behavior of the banks themselves and government as explicit shareholder,
23. See generally THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984).
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bondholder, and/or creditor. Similarly, as we saw in the subsequent
multi-billion-dollar rescue of the financial, housing, and automobile sectors, direct government investment in an industry is likely to increase
the government’s intrusion in the operations of the industry; but such
intrusion does not derive from tax status or treatment.
In order to justify receipt of a tax benefit, recipients are usually required to demonstrate only that they actually undertook the activity
or incurred the expense giving rise to the tax-favored treatment. The
tax benefit does not impose any other restrictions on the recipients.
The recipients’ assets are not deemed public because of the tax benefit,
and the recipients are not thereby treated as public entities. There is no
compelling reason to hold foundations and other charities to a different
standard with regard to their autonomy and the independence of their
decision-making and operations.
Indeed, in the nonprofit context courts and commentators have
stressed the limited relationship that a tax exemption creates between
government and the beneficiary. In the 1870s, Charles W. Eliot, then
president of Harvard University, dismissed as “sophistical and fallacious” the assertion that “to exempt an institution from taxation is the
same thing as to grant it money directly from the public treasury.”24
The net effect of the two types of transactions on the public treasury
may be the same, but the relationships created by the transactions between government and private decision makers are very different.25
Exemptions and deductions do not improperly involve government
in the recipients’ decision-making. Indeed, the role of government is essentially passive. For example, with the charitable contribution deduction, the donor, not the government, decides whether to give at all, in
what amounts and forms, to which qualified charities, and whether
24. Belknap, “Introduction” note 6, at 2038 (quoting CHARLES ELIOT, VIEWS RESPECTING PRESENT EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF PROPERTY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL AND CHARITABLE PURPOSES 382-83 (1874)).
25. Id.
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any designations or restrictions accompany the contributions.26 Nor
does the charitable tax exemption involve a decision by government to
favor any specifically identified organizations. As one commentator on
foundations observed, exemptions actually “insulate private charitable
enterprises from the government domination which is invited by the
alternative method of direct grants by government.”27
The lack of government involvement on account of exemptions and
deductions stands in contrast to the government’s intentional and direct
role when it provides direct subsidies, grants, and government contracts;
in such cases, government personnel affirmatively decide what organizations will receive how much money, for what purposes, and subject to
what restrictions.28 Justice William Brennan’s concurring opinion in Walz
v. Tax Commission, a noted Supreme Court case upholding the property
tax exemption of churches as part of a neutrally conceived exemption
regime, characterized direct subsidies as “pregnant with involvement” by
government29 and drew the distinction between subsidies and tax exemptions: “A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public moneys to the subsidized taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, involves
no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by re26. FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that the advantage of exemptions and deductions over direct government subsidies is to allow individuals to make choices
in directing their support rather than having such support determined “through
the haggling and logrolling of politically elected legislative bodies or the choices
of a particular governmental administration, Congress, or agency . . .”). See also
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011),
discussed below.
27. Belknap, “Introduction” note 6, at 2038.
28. See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, 131 S.Ct. at 1447.
29. Walz, supra note 11, 397 U.S. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring). Government
would not have been permitted to provide a direct subsidy to the church, as
opposed to a tax exemption, because of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. “Obviously,” Justice Brennan stated, “a direct money subsidy
would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative
relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards, but that
is not this case.”
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lieving a privately funded venture of the burden of paying taxes.”30 Justice
Brennan noted that direct subsidies involve government “forcibly,” by diverting taxpayer income to the recipient; whereas with an exemption,
government “merely refrains from diverting to its own uses income independently generated . . . through voluntary contributions.”31
In a 2011 five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court appeared to support Justice Brennan’s analysis. The Court found the distinction between
subsidies and exemptions important enough to justify denying a taxpayer
standing to challenge the constitutionality of an Arizona tax credit for
contributions to organizations that provide scholarships to private
schools, some of which are religious.32 Notably, the Court recognized
that “contributions result from the decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds. Private citizens create private [school tuition organizations (“STOs”)]; STOs choose beneficiary schools; and taxpayers then
contribute to STOs. . . . [T]he tax credit system is implemented by private
action with no state intervention.”33 The Court further noted that taxpayers “spend their own money, not money the State has collected” when
contributing to the STOs.34 Moreover, “like contributions that lead to
charitable tax deductions,” such contributions “are not owed to the State
and, in fact, pass directly from taxpayers to private organizations.”35 The
30. Id. at 690, 691.
31. Id. (citations omitted).
32. Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, supra note 28, 131 S.Ct. at
1447–48. The substance of the case, which the Court did not reach because of
its procedural decision to deny standing, concerned Establishment Clause principles of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 1440. In essence, the taxpayer claimed the right to assert the unconstitutionality of the Arizona legislation because the dollar-for-dollar reduction in income taxes paid diverted funds from the public treasury for the benefit of
religious schools, some of which discriminated on the basis of religion. Id. at
1440–41 . The Supreme Court reversed Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both standing and the merits.
33. Id. at 1448.
34. Id. at 1447.
35. Id. at 1448.
66

Evelyn Brody and John Tyler

Court distinguished such behavior from situations in which the government “collects and spends taxpayer money,” in which case “governmental choices are responsible for the transfer of wealth.”36
Of course, one might go further and observe that even direct government subsidies do not automatically alter the character of otherwise
private enterprises. Boeing’s assets do not become “public money” because it contracts to provide the Department of Defense with military
equipment, even if substantial amounts of Boeing’s total revenues come
from such government contracts. McKinsey’s assets do not become
“public” because it contracts with government to provide consulting
services. Nor do Boeing and McKinsey lose their autonomy or independence by virtue of such contracts. An organization might elect to
compromise or sacrifice its autonomy and privacy in return for a government contract or grant or to comply with the conditions of the contract or grant. But such compromise or sacrifice would be the product
of some other kind of conscious decision-making, not because of the
existence of the government contract or grant itself.
Finally, autonomy challenges to a private organization that accepts
a government contract or grant are not relevant to private foundations,
which receive neither government contracts nor government grants.
Thus, foundations fall squarely within the distinction between subsidies
and exemptions that Justice Brennan made in Walz and that the Court
accepted in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization.

36. Id at 1447. The four Justices who dissented, in an opinion written by Justice
Elena Kagan, emphasized the economic effect of the tax credit as a subsidy and
argued that, at least in an Establishment Clause case, the decision-making distinction noted by the majority (and by Justice Brennan in Walz) has “as little
basis in principle as it has in our precedent.” Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
It was, Justice Kagan called it, a distinction “in search of a difference.” Id. at
1455. See also id. at 1456 (citing and quoting Supreme Court decisions equating
targeted tax breaks and tax expenditures (such as deductions, credits and exemptions) with direct subsidies and appropriations.
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In sum, the reasoning in the nonprofit context is the same as the
reasoning that prevents business or individual assets from being treated
as public money on account of tax-favored treatment. There is no compelling reason to hold foundations and other charities to a different
standard with regard to their independence, privacy, and autonomous
decision-making and operation. As a legal matter, for foundations and
other charities to be treated consistently with other sectors, they should
be required to use the funds for charitable, exempt purposes and to
document and report the fact that they have done so.37 The receipt of
tax benefits should not entitle government or the public to dictate other
aspects of the organizations’ activities.

C. Even if the tax-favored treatment of
foundations and other charities is viewed
as a government subsidy or grant, most
charitable assets come not from
government but rather from private funds.
The most common version of the public-money theory says that government may direct foundations and other charities because of the “contributions” made by government on account of the tax subsidies it gives
37. Individual organizations may choose to pursue greater degrees of external accountability and transparency for public relations or other purposes. Some may
even legitimately encourage such openness as a matter of individual and sector
credibility. Such self-determination and informational efforts are a far cry from
externally imposed mandates or their equivalent. The forthcoming second volume in The Philanthropy Roundtable’s “Principles of Philanthropy” series by
John Tyler more thoroughly considers issues relating to philanthropic transparency. The monograph advocates the potential benefits to foundations in voluntarily and strategically providing more information and access than is
required by law, and it highlights defects in certain arguments for mandating
greater transparency by force of law or public duty. See John Tyler, THE GOOD,
THE BAD, AND THE USEFUL IN PHILANTHROPIC “TRANSPARENCY” DEBATES (THE
Philanthropy Roundtable, forthcoming).
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them. However, even if we accept a tax subsidy theory, the public-money
advocates must still overcome the other four arguments set out in this
chapter concerning the limitations on government control. Furthermore,
even if we accept a tax subsidy theory, the government’s “contributions”
would make government not the sole contributor of every philanthropy
but only a contributor to the extent of forgone taxes, which often represent only a portion of a foundation or charity’s resources.
Most charitable assets and resources have their source in private
contributions, fees for goods and services, and investment returns. The
bulk of contributions are not attributable to the donors’ tax savings on
contributions. As a threshold matter, individual taxpayers can deduct
their contributions only if they itemize their deductions (and only about
a third of taxpayers do). At the other extreme, a donor whose gifts exceed a certain percentage of income must carryforward the excess (and
an unused carryforward expires after five years).38
Otherwise, the “price” of giving varies by the taxpayer’s marginal tax
rate. Consider this example: A donor whose income is marginally taxed
at 35 percent contributes $100 to a charity. Leaving aside other tax rules,
the donor, by deducting the contribution in computing his or her taxable
income, saves $35 in taxes. But the balance of the contribution, $65,
would not have been paid to the IRS, and is clearly “private money.”

38. Simplifying the rules of §170, if the donee is a public charity, then cash contributions may reduce the donor’s adjusted gross income (AGI) by up to 50 percent. If the donee is a private foundation, then cash contributions may reduce
AGI by up to only 30 percent. If instead the donor contributes appreciated capital assets and deducts fair market value rather than basis, then the percentageof-income limit is 30 percent for a public charity donee and 20 percent for a
private foundation. Furthermore, for private foundations, only publicly traded
securities qualify for the fair-market-value deduction. Corporate donors, generally subject to the same rules, can deduct up to 10 percent of gross income in
any one year. An unlimited estate-tax deduction is available for charitable bequests. This discussion ignores the alternative minimum tax, other rules that
affect marginal tax rates, and the estate tax (whose top rates have sometimes
exceeded top income-tax rates).
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The same type of reasoning applies to the tax exemption. Let us assume that tax policy can effectively identify the amounts that would
be treated—in the absence of the exemption—as the gross income of a
nonprofit and the expenses of producing this income, so as to determine the net taxable income of the nonprofit. We will further assume
that tax policy can apply a properly determined tax rate to this net taxable income. Consider a nonprofit generating $100 in income that
would be marginally taxed (absent the exemption) at 35 percent.39 The
nonprofit would pay $35 to the Treasury. However, the remaining $65
of income would not be payable to the Treasury. The $65 would be
“private” income of the nonprofit, which the nonprofit could devote
to its chosen charitable causes in the manner it determined.
Unless income tax rates exceed 50 percent for a prolonged period
of time, most of the resources of foundations and other charities will
be private.40 Organizations managing mostly private assets for charitable exempt purposes should not suffer diminished autonomy because
a portion of their assets might otherwise have been paid as taxes. Even
if tax rates exceeded fifty percent, this fact would not render charitable
assets public. To argue otherwise risks falling into the trap of the narrow quid pro quo approach by focusing solely on objective valuation
metrics to the exclusion of the intangible but no less valuable contributions that foundations and other charities provide to society.
Some public-money advocates acknowledge this weakness by referring to philanthropic assets as “partially public money.” The partially39. In fact, the charity would likely have little or no operating income. Thus, the
tax exemption for charities is better thought of as an exemption for investment income. See Daniel I. Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments—Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized? 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 17 (Jan. 2011)
(Part I), and 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 125 (Feb. 2011) (Part II).
40. Moreover, policy makers can alter the tax treatment of contributions. For example, the Obama administration has proposed to cap the tax savings from
itemized deductions (including charitable contributions) at 28 percent; but
doing so would not affect the independence, autonomy, or privacy of the
donee organizations.
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public-money argument appears to view the government as being entitled to influence the purposes, governance, and operations of foundations and other charities just as would a shareholder of a business
corporation owning an equivalent interest. But the “ownership” analogy does not hold. Donors to a charity—even major donors—are not
as such endowed by the law with the legal rights of shareholders. Of
course, donors can restrict the charitable use of their gifts, which the
government does in its capacity as grant maker. Otherwise, unless they
serve on the board or have the status of members with the right to vote
for the board, donors are just another group, albeit an important one,
seeking to influence the governing board’s policies and operations.
Nonprofit and charity laws reflect the historically limited, complex relationship between philanthropy and government, in contrast to the
more straightforward, and usually proportionate, authority of shareholders of a business.

D. Foundations and other charities that
are involved with government only
indirectly, through their tax exemptions,
should not face restrictions or impositions
more onerous than the limitations that
entities face when they are involved with
government directly, through grants or
contracts.
A private organization, either nonprofit or for-profit, that receives a government grant or contract may be required to abide by restrictions in addition to the organization’s obligation to perform its central task under
the grant or contract. For example, defense firms under contract with
the government may be required to follow government procedures in let71
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ting bids for subcontracts or to do business with certain numbers of minority-owned or woman-owned businesses. Social service organizations
that accept more than $500,000 in government grants or contracts agree
to requirements including compliance with the Single Audit Act.
However, the government grantee or contractor has autonomously
and affirmatively chosen, in furtherance of goals that it has independently set, to enter into the grant or contract. Moreover, the grantee or
contractor has done so in exchange for direct and specific benefits from
government. Furthermore, the restrictions under the contract rarely affect matters of internal governance and, in any event, apply only for
the term of the benefits. There is no suggestion that the contract has
created public ownership of the contractor’s assets. Equally important,
the grantee or contractor does not surrender indefinite control of its
goals, operations, or capacity for self-direction.
In contrast, under the public-money theory of the tax-favored treatment of nonprofits, an exempt organization, in exchange for a benefit
much less direct and specific than the benefit received by a grantee or
contractor, would be required to accept government direction and control that are more fundamental and longer-lasting. Sound policy would
not make this kind of distinction.41

41. Pifer, “Introduction” note 17, at 54–55, stated as follows:
Throughout our history we have believed in pluralism and have
practiced it. We have recognized that the nation’s public purposes
are considerably more extensive in scope than its governmental
purposes, and through the aegis of the state, we have enabled a
wide variety of private institutions, including foundations, to be
chartered to accomplish certain public, though nongovernmental, purposes. We have also, through the aegis of the state, given
tax exemption to those institutions to facilitate their work and
have regarded this as being eminently in the public interest.
Therefore, to attribute the public stake in the foundation to its
tax-exempt status or to regard this status as a “privilege” is
wholly erroneous. It is, in Professor Milton Katz’s pithy phrase,
“to mistake an effect for a cause.”
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It would also be contrary to sound public policy to interject government excessively into the operational decisions of foundations and
other charities based on the presence of direct contracts or grants.42
Doing so elevates the legislature or regulator as a sort of “super” member of the organization’s board of directors. Such organizations would
have to choose between continuing to operate with compromised autonomy, finding alternative non-governmental funding sources, or reducing or stopping delivery of services paid for by government—which
might also mean closing. Because government often relies on these organizations to deliver services more efficiently or effectively than government can or to deliver services government cannot deliver, requiring
broad-based operational compliance with unnecessarily intrusive policy
mandates could, paradoxically, ultimately undermine government’s efforts to serve its constituents.
Of course, government has an obligation to ensure the wise and appropriate use of taxpayer resources, and standards for administration of grants
and contracts can rightfully serve such purposes, provided the requirements
do not become a means for substituting political judgments or arbitrary
values for the legitimate authority of a board and its management.

E. The tax-favored treatment of foundations and other charities, like the taxfavored treatment of businesses and
individuals, does not entitle government
to impose unconstitutional conditions on
recipients.
It should go without saying—but, in the case of the public-money theory, it unfortunately cannot—that the limitation of government in order
42. See notes 1 through 6, and accompanying text. See also, infra, note 48.
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to preserve liberty is one of the bedrock principles of our constitutional
regime.43 This principle applies not only to for-profit enterprises but to
the nonprofit sector as well. The principle formed the basis of a warning by federal appellate court Judge Richard Posner about the danger
of the IRS being able to revoke an exemption, without finding a breach
of fiduciary duty, simply because it disagrees with decisions by a nonprofit entity’s management.44 The same principle is the basis of the
Supreme Court doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions.
When engaged in direct grantmaking and contracting, the government may generally choose the message it wishes to express, either directly or by funding the speech of others. A government grant or
contract is not a constitutional right; thus, the government may condition such a benefit on the recipient’s waiver of otherwise available constitutional rights, notably including the rights of free speech and
association. However, the Constitution provides an outer limit to the
conditions that governments can impose on grants of benefits. The conditions may cover only what the recipient does with funds provided by
government, not the recipient’s actions in general.45 As the Supreme
Court has explained, unconstitutional conditions “involve situations
43. See Belknap, “Introduction” note 7, at 2031, stating that the charitable exemption
“probably” developed in America out of a widely present political philosophy embodying the spirit of classical liberalism, the “dominant tenets” of which “were
distrust of government and faith that the progress and well-being of mankind
could best be achieved by natural forces harmonizing the individual actions of men
who were left untrammeled.” See also Heather Higgins, To Whom Does Your
Money Belong?, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at A16 (quoting
Thomas Jefferson: “A wise and frugal government, which shall leave men free to
regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from
the mouth of labor the bread it has earned—this is the sum of good government”).
44. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173, 1178–79 (7th
Cir. 1999). See also Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the
I.R.S. Role in Charity Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 583 n.152 (1999)
(quoting Judge Posner in United Cancer Council).
45. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991), the Supreme Court upheld federal
rules prohibiting a federally funded family planning program from providing abor74

Evelyn Brody and John Tyler

in which the government has placed a condition on the recipient of [a]
subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus, effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in [constitutionally] protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.”46 For example, the government may condition a contract on the contractor’s
following nondiscriminatory hiring policies in carrying out the contract, but may not impose conditions on the contractor’s policies in
areas unconnected with the contract.
Similarly, a tax exemption is not a constitutional right. Governments generally are granted broad latitude in designing tax schemes,
including the tax regime that offers exemptions to nonprofits, and may
impose conditions on such exemptions. These conditions do not in
themselves implicate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, but
limits similar to those that exist with respect to grants and contracts
apply. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the Supreme Court
upheld Congress’s right, as a condition of section 501(c)(3) tax exemption, to refuse to allow a nonprofit to engage in more than insubstantial
lobbying. But the Court based its holding in part on the right of the
section 501(c)(3) organization to create an affiliated section 501(c)(4)
organization to engage in such lobbying. The charitable activity of the
section 501(c)(3) group, including advocacy that did not amount to
lobbying, could be supported by tax-deductible charitable contribu-

tion counseling, on grounds that the grantee “can continue to perform abortions,
provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy . . . through
programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives [government] funds.” See generally Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); NATIONAL CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY AND THE
LAW, EMANATIONS FROM RUST: THE IMPACT ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR OF THE
DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS (Conference Papers, 1992).
46. Rust, supra note 45, 500 U.S. at 197.
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tions; the (c)(4)’s lobbying activity could not, but the (c)(4) could exercise the affiliated group’s free speech rights by lobbying.47
The jurisprudence on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
sparse. Conditioning a grant on a grantee’s giving up its right to its chosen legally-permitted form of self-governance—for example, by requiring
that all of its directors be democratically elected by all of its members—
would be a significant limitation on the grantee’s right of expressive association and could well be deemed an unconstitutional condition.48

47. Taxation With Representation, supra note 11, 461 U.S. at 545. The Court distinguished Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which disallowed, as an unconstitutional condition, a California provision requiring any person seeking a
property tax exemption to declare that he or she did not advocate the forcible
overthrow of the U.S. government. Speiser stated that to “deny an exemption
to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them
for such speech.” Id. at 518. In contrast, in the case of Taxation With Representation (“TWR”), the Court stated, “Congress has merely refused to pay for
the lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that Congress
must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.” Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 545. It
should be noted that in addition to a (c)(3)’s ability to create a § 501(c)(4) organization, the (c)(4) can create a separate segregated fund or political action
committee under § 527 to engage in political activity.
48. The Maine legislature recently considered a legislative proposal that would
have applied to nonprofit corporations receiving at least 25 percent of their
total funding from government sources and would have prohibited such corporations from paying any officer or director more than $250,000 per year in
compensation. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B § 718.2.A (enacted April 16,
2008) (available at LEXIS, Maine Library, ME Full-Text Bills Folder, as 2007
Bill Text ME S.B. 636). However, the legislation as ultimately enacted merely
requires the nonprofits to report such compensation publicly. Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 13-B § 718.2.A.
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Conclusion
Foundations and other charities exist at a critical intersection between
the governmental and business sectors of our political, economic, and
social system. They are dedicated to serving the public through the pursuit of charitable purposes but are created and operate as private, autonomous organizations. Their accountability is complex in nature and
extent, derived in part from law and in part from the need for legitimacy.
This complexity enables charities to serve as private arenas for the development of the public virtues of idealism, inventiveness,1 and civic association; to provide essential goods and services that are undersupplied
by government and the marketplace2; and to offer both an alternative
to dependence on government and a softening of the rough edges of
capitalism.3 It is in this sense that charities and foundations are “a ‘powerful third force,’ distinct from government and business,” as one term
for the charitable sector—“independent sector”—suggests.4
We have concluded that based on more than four centuries of law
and policy, foundations and other charities are not inherently public bodies and their assets are not “public money.” Each step in the argument
that charities or their assets are fundamentally public seeks to erode this
1. K. Martin Worthy, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Consequences for Private
Foundations, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 232, 254 (Autumn 1975).
2. See generally MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004); Crimm, “Chapter III”
note 9, at 439; Colombo, Harvard, “Chapter III” note 9, at 864–65; Leslie
Lenkowsky, In Philanthropy, It’s Not Just About the Numbers, CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 29, 2009 (available at http://philanthropy.com/article/InPhilanthropy-Its-Not-Just/56666/).
3. See CLAIRE GAUDIANI, THE GREATER GOOD: HOW PHILANTHROPY DRIVES THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY AND CAN SAVE CAPITALISM 14 (2003). See also Schramm,
“Chapter II” note 12, at 368.
4. FLEISHMAN, “Chapter III” note 4, at 14; see also GAUDIANI, supra note 3, at 23.
See note 10, “Introduction,” regarding the term “independent sector.”
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distinction. As Justice Story warned in Dartmouth College, each step
brings us closer to government asserting the right to control and direct
foundations and other charities, conflating the government and nonprofit
sectors, and subjecting charitable assets and operations to the “good will
and pleasure” of the persons and prevailing ideas that happen to hold
political power at any particular time.5
At the same time, abuses within the charitable sector are dangerous
to the general society and culture just as are abuses within the government
or business sector, particularly when the abuse is rampant and pervasive.
Federal and state laws and regulations are in place to protect against such
abuses. Moreover, it is in the interest of the sector, as well as society as a
whole, that foundations and other charities devote sufficient internal resources to achieving compliance with these laws and regulations and to
detecting, correcting, and imposing consequences for their violation.
Thus, as in other sectors, it can be appropriate to modify applicable laws,
regulations, and enforcement priorities in the charitable sector to bring
clarity and certainty to the law when vagueness causes compliance problems. It may even be necessary to effect large-scale, revolutionary reforms
when insidious and widespread abuses infect the sector and enforcement
of existing law cannot suffice to restore order and credibility.
However, the consequences of fundamental change in the relationship between foundations and other charities and government could
be significant. Such organizations might face increased pressure to accede to strong feelings or prejudices on the part of prospective or rejected grant applicants or beneficiaries, politicians, or the general
public.6 To judge by the present operations of the governmental sector,
charities might also be expected to place increased emphasis on their
5. Dartmouth College, “Chapter II” note 39, 17 U.S. at 660–61.
6. See FLEISHMAN, “Chapter III” note 4, at 61–62, 250; Schramm, “Chapter II”
note 12, at 30; Bittker, “Chapter III” note 14, at 342; Lawrence M. Stone, The
Charitable Foundation: Its Governance, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 65
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short-term metrics at the expense of long-term goals.7 Charities could
find that they have fewer incentives to take reasonable, let alone controversial, programmatic risks that government and business may not
responsibly take. If so, we may face the loss of innovative solutions to
social problems.8
The most significant harm that could result from a wholesale change
in the traditional relationships is that the philanthropic sector would no
longer be the product of pluralistic choices, freely made, regarding the
expenditure of monetary and human resources. Autonomy has been one
of the defining characteristics of American foundations and other charities; such entities are free to support and pursue differing and even contrary programmatic visions, strategies, methods, and structures provided
that they do not stray from their mandate to serve charitable purposes.9
Observers have credited this pluralism with helping to preserve funda(1975); Homer C. Wordsworth, Private Foundations and the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 259 (1975); DAVID F. FREEMAN &
COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, THE HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 77
(1991). Some may view a lack of responsiveness to public demands as a weakness. However, the philanthropic sector has limited resources, especially when
compared to those of the government or business sector. In addition, foundations—and other charities—are required to be faithful to donor intent. This responsibility will result in the rejection of applications by otherwise worthy
applicants. More generally, foundations simply cannot responsibly fund every
grant applicant; those that try to do so may find, more often than not, that
they have either abdicated their decision-making responsibilities or impaired
their obligations to their charitable purposes. Foundation autonomy helps protect against these inevitable pressures and their potentially harmful consequences.
7. See FLEISHMAN, “Chapter III” note 4, at 245–48. Bittker, “Chapter III” note
14, at 342.
8. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE, “Introduction” note 16, at ii (quoting John Gardner); FREEMAN, supra note 130, at 6; Bittker, “Chapter III” note 90, at 299;
Wordsworth, supra note 6, at 259; Stone, supra note 6, at 58, 61 n.9; 93 Cong.
Rec. 33952, 33954 (1974). See also Colombo, Marketing, “Chapter III” note
8, at 692; CURTIS W. MEADOWS, JR., PHILANTHROPIC CHOICE AND DONOR INTENT: FREEDOM, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (Center for Public and
Nonprofit Leadership, Georgetown University, 2002).
9. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE, “Introduction” note 16, at ii. See also Susan Berres79
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mental American values such as individual choice and initiative10; advancing civilization and promoting general welfare11; multiplying, rather
than concentrating, sources of power12; representing society’s preference
for reasonable discretion rather than government-imposed uniformity13;
enhancing the vibrancy of our democracy through their capacity to challenge conventional wisdom14; and allowing charities—particularly, but
not only, religious organizations—freedom to choose their missions and
to make their decisions without government involvement.15

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

15.

ford and Lorie Slutsky, Foundations’ Longevity Should be Valued, CHRONICLE
OF PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 2, 2008 (available at http://philanthropy.com/article/
Foundations-Longevity-Should/60745/).
MEADOWS, supra note 8, at 2 (“As a free people we want the right to live our
lives with as much freedom and individual choice as possible, including the
making and selection of philanthropic and charitable choices”); Colombo,
Harvard, “Chapter III” note 9, at 865 (quoting Bruce Hopkins’ view of exemptions as a “bulwark against overdomination by government and a hallmark of a free society” and of exempt organizations as “help[ing] nourish the
voluntary sector of this nation and preserve individual initiative, and
reflect[ing] the pluralistic philosophy that has been the guiding spirit of democratic America”); Belknap, “Introduction” note 6, at 2025, 2036–37 (quoting
NATIONAL PLANNING ASS’N, THE MANUAL OF CORPORATE GIVING (Beardsley
Ruml, in collaboration with Theodore Geiger, ed.), Ch. 1 (1952), as to the
need for “preserving to the maximum extent possible the decentralized and
private character of the decision-making process in all phases of our national
life”); Belknap, “Introduction” note 6 at 2036–37 (quoting statement of M.
M. Chambers, CHARTERS OF PHILANTHROPIES 2 (1948), that operation of the
voluntary sector “accords with the historic idea of a wide sphere of individual
liberties”).
Belknap, “Introduction” note 6, at 2034 (quoting People ex rel. Seminary of
Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, 42 Hun. 27 (1886), aff’d without opinion, 13
N.E. 936 (N.Y. 1887)).
FLEISHMAN, “Chapter III” note 4, at 33.
Brody, Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1406–07
(1998) (society prefers reasonable discretion exercised by different participants
under different conditions to the uniformity of government-directed action).
Lenkowsky, supra note 2 (“Philanthropy’s value goes far beyond its social and
economic benefits”); FLEISHMAN, “Chapter III” note 4, at 56, 250; FREMONTSMITH, supra note 2, at 2; Stone, supra note 6, at 66.
Sugin, “Chapter III” note 22, at 435 (“Regardless of whether individual choice
is socially desirable, it is constitutionally significant because it can separate the
government’s intent from the ultimate recipient of tax benefits”).
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Clearly, impairing the independence, autonomy and fundamentally
private nature of foundations and other charities could have serious
consequences for them, the sector, and broader society, particularly if
grounded on a theory that lacks meaningful support in law, history, or
policy. Fortunately, such compromises are not necessary for constructive debate to proceed on such issues as the direction and role of the
independent sector, donor intent, perpetuity, governing board composition, measuring effectiveness, mission-related investing, and governance best practices. Discussion of these and other issues informs
donors, board members, and managers of foundations and other charities and can help these organizations make decisions that are best for
them in their specific circumstances. However, those debates and conversations deserve an appropriate framework within which to proceed.
By debunking the idea that charities and their assets belong to the public at large and are subject to democratic control, we hope to more appropriately focus the current debates and conversations on the merits
of the underlying substantive issues without distractions associated
with misapplication of the phrase “public money.”
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In recent years, some public officials and advocacy groups have urged that
private philanthropies be subject to more uniform standards and stricter
government regulation—ranging from board composition to grant distribution
to philanthropies' charitable purposes. A major justification cited by advocates
of these proposals is the claim that the charitable tax exemption and deduction
are government subsidies, and thus philanthropic funds are "public money"
and should be publicly controlled. Some advocates also claim that philanthropic assets are public money because philanthropies operate under state
charters and are subject to state oversight. In the second edition of this monograph, legal scholars Evelyn Brody and John Tyler evaluate the legal basis of
the "public money" claim. They conclude that it is not well founded in legal
authority. State oversight of philanthropies is not based on an assertion that
philanthropies are subject to state direction or that their assets belong to the
public, they write. Similarly, the fact that philanthropies have state charters
does not make them state agencies or subject them to the constraints that
apply to public bodies. Finally, the philanthropies and their donors receive their
federal tax benefits in return for the obligation to pursue public rather than
private purposes and to comply with the laws designed to ensure the pursuit
of such purposes. There is no evidence, Brody and Tyler find, that these benefits
were meant to give government other types of control over philanthropies.
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